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ABSTRACT 
 
The Government of Botswana, since independence in 1966 has initiated several 
schemes in a bid to support and development its local construction Industry. In 1975 
the Government established Botswana Enterprises Development Unit (BEDU) with 
the assistance of international donor agencies. The Government realised that 
sustainable development would based on meaningful participation of citizens in 
private sector, by engaging in greater agricultural production, by increasingly become 
engaged as businessmen in trade, in manufacturing and I providing an expanding 
services.  BEDU was responsible for introducing the then new concept of local 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Development of local human resource and localisation was one of the priority 
objectives of the Botswana Enterprises Development Programme. In 1975 BEDU 
replicated Kenya’s NCC (National Construction Corporation) a small contractor 
development agency, just like the Kenyan NCC BEDU did not achieve much of the 
set objectives. 
 
In the 1980’s the Government of Botswana formulated preferential schemes that 
favoured and protect citizen contractor against foreign construction companies. 
Despite government‘s commitment to citizen contractor empowerment, there have 
been reports of poor performance by citizen contractors. Between 2001 and 2005, 93 
per cent of public projects undertaken by citizen contractors had cost and time 
overruns, 16 per cent of the 187 projects investigated had been abandoned. The 
Government had to spend over P 70, 000,000:00 (seventy million Pula) to get these 
projects completed by others. There is strong evidence that Botswana as a 
developing country has a potential of utilising the infrastructure development projects 
for the benefit of socio-economic development by engaging meaningful participation 
of citizen in the construction industry. The existing available data was analysed as an 
attempt to establish the cause of failure and what should be done to improve the 
prevailing situation. 
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The Literature review has revealed good examples of countries that have embarked 
on a long-term indigenous construction industry development as national project and 
have successfully achieved their set objectives. Botswana can learn from countries 
such as Singapore, Malaysia and its neighbouring state South Africa on how to set 
up an appropriate Construction development programme.  
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CHAPTER 1:  Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the problem 
 
At Independence in 1966, Botswana was classified among the poorest nations in the 
world. Like most developing countries, Botswana was faced with challenges of ever 
increasing unemployment and extreme poverty of a large percentage of its 
population. From the outset the government’s major goals were to engender financial 
independence and to provide a basic economic infrastructure, including clean water, 
schools, clinics, roads, electricity and hospitals. 
 
In the early 1970s, as a result of minerals discovery, Botswana became one of the 
fastest growing economies in the world. Revenues from minerals sales enabled the 
Government to embark on extensive infrastructure development throughout the 
country, thus creating employment opportunities and alleviating poverty. 
 
The majority of the population was unskilled and therefore the country relied heavily 
on expatriates for skilled human resources.  During the early years of independence 
the nation’s founding fathers realised that a genuine sustained development should 
involve citizens as entrepreneurs.  The Botswana Enterprises Development Unit 
(BEDU) was established by the Government under the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry to encourage local entrepreneurs to firmly establish themselves as 
producers of certain local goods and services, as well as to develop a certain degree 
of confidence in local industry in terms of competitiveness and quality. The fulfilment 
of these ambitious aspirations depended on having sufficient funds to successfully 
carry out the National Development Plans (NDP), the first of which was published in 
1968. 
 
According to the Botswana Enterprises Development Unit (BEDU) the first President 
of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, in his foreword to the National Development Plan 
1973 – 78 was recorded as saying “ …… yet, in future, genuine sustained 
development must be based on a steady increase in the income earning activities in 
the private sector.  Not only do we need greater agricultural production, but also 
Batswana must increasingly become engaged as businessmen in trade, in 
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manufacturing and in providing a variety of basic services.  The time has come for 
the nation to look firstly to its own people for initiative and entrepreneurship outside 
the traditional sector”. Certainly these words were an inspiration to a newly born 
nation, as they emphasised that effective localisation was to continue to be one of 
the top priority objectives of the Government.  Of equal importance was the 
recruitment of citizens to enable transfer of skills from expatriate to locals (ter Haar 
1976; page 3).   
 
It is regrettable to note that over 40 years later, little has been achieved in the 
construction industry in terms of citizen contractor development and localisation in 
both public and private sectors responsible for the implementation of Government 
development projects. Despite government efforts and interventions that are meant to 
support, develop and protect citizen contractors against their foreign counterparts, 
the country still relies heavily on expatriate personnel in the construction industry and 
the Government continues to lose huge sums of money on abandoned projects by 
citizen contractors. This is an indication that there is a deficiency in approach and 
implementation of the government initiatives.  
 
1.2  Problem Definition 
 
Since independence, Botswana has adopted policies in its construction industry 
aimed at developing its citizen contractors and recently citizen consultants to enable 
them to compete in the global market in a bid for employment creation. The 
Government instituted a number of interventions such as a 30% Reservation Policy 
which ensures project allocation to citizen contractors; and once the contractor 
secures a project, the government provides contractors with an advance loan to 
enable them to mobilise. Such facilities were supposed to greatly enhance their 
capacity for success. 
 
Despite Government interventions, it is apparent that the expected results of 
employment creation, poverty alleviation and citizen empowerment have not been 
realized and that citizen construction companies continue to fail. Among the schemes 
introduced to assist citizen owned contractors are: the controversial P 50 million 
case-by-case bailout of 1998, the 30 % reservation policy for 100% citizen owned 
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construction firms for Government projects in excess of 1.8 million Pula, the 
preferential and reservation scheme for citizen owned companies in project tenders, 
waiving of performance bond requirements and reduction of retentions on contracts, 
and the advance mobilization loan scheme (CAB 32 B; page 1-4). The above are 
considered to be mechanisms for citizen economic empowerment to enable citizen-
owned construction firms to be sustainable and compete favourably in the open 
market, and thus retain the scarce financial resources, which the Government invests 
in infrastructure construction development projects.  
 
However, there are many reported cases of non-performance by citizen contractors 
resulting in abandoned projects, terminated construction contracts, and delayed 
project completion dates, resulting in escalation of project costs.  For example, 
between 2001 and 2005 the Government has spent over P70 million on abandoned 
projects, excluding overrun projects (CAB 32 B; page1-4). 
 
In order to objectively and critically assess and evaluate Botswana citizen 
empowerment programmes concerning the “Building Construction Industry”, a 
comparison has to be made with the already developed principles and strategies on 
Small Contractor Development worldwide, especially in developing countries. There 
are disturbing reports of an exodus of citizen professionals from public employment 
to private sector or even abandon their careers. The study will attempt to review 
career development, institutional, organisational and human resource capacity within 
the Department of Buildings and Engineering Services (DBES). 
 
The context of the policies in place has been evaluated to measure their alignment to 
the broader development objectives of Citizen Empowerment on Built Environment in 
Botswana. 
 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
 
• The objective of this study is to briefly review literature on small contractor 
development programmes carried out in developing countries.  
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• To briefly review literature on institutional, organisational and human resource 
development. 
• To analyse the concept of small contractor and related institutional, 
organisational and human resource development. 
• Seek to establish the relevance of institutional, organisational and human 
resource within public and private sector. 
• To identify lessons of success and problems experienced in the 
implementation of small contractor development. 
• To compare and contrast with Botswana’s initiative on citizen contractor 
empowerment. 
• To make recommendations of solutions in cognisance with what literature has 
revealed in order to improve the prevailing situation. 
 
1.4 Goal and Benefit of this study 
 
The study attempts to emphasize the fundamental fact that poverty alleviation 
initiatives will not succeed without sustainable employment opportunities and also to 
establish and reveal the shortcomings of the current citizen contractor assistance 
schemes, and prompt the Government to consider setting up a programme 
specifically for the implementation and co-ordination of Government policies on 
citizen contractor development, which involves the entire construction industry and 
interest groups.   
 
According to International Labour Organisation (ILO) the development of the local 
contracting industry in developing countries should be able to mobilise and effectively 
utilise local human and material resources and is recognised as an important means 
to promote employment, improve efficiency and at the same time develop an efficient 
way to develop and maintain infrastructure (ILO, 2006; page 1). Utilisation of local 
human and material resource would mean that government should invest on skill 
development of its citizens in both material manufacturing and building construction 
sectors.  
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1.5 Scope 
 
This study is not reviewing the performance of labour-based contractors development 
programme in Botswana, it is rather primarily concerned about continuous failure of 
citizen “building” contractors despite government long-term support with several 
interventions and also the study attempt to ascertain whether current schemes are 
strategies to address main national objectives, which are employment-creation and 
poverty alleviation. The study attempt to unveil prevailing problems within Botswana’s 
building industry. However, building construction sector is labour-intensive by its 
nature, but it requires high level of skilled labour force as compared to civil works 
construction sector. Contractors in both sectors share common problems when it 
comes to institutional and organisational capacity or capability. Therefore, there are 
lessons to be learned by reviewing literature on labour-intensive programmes.   
 
It is important to point out that Public Works in Botswana are fragmented into 
implementation ministries and departments. For example, building works and related 
infrastructure (civil) works are under the Department of Building and Engineering 
Services, Ministry of Works and Transport (MOWT), Water supply and sewer 
reticulation works are under Department of Water Affairs, Ministry of Minerals and 
Energy, District Councils under Ministry of Local government are responsible for all 
infrastructure development at Local Government level or rural areas, and Roads 
Department under Ministry of Works and Transport is responsible for national roads. 
 
Summary 
 
It is apparent that immediately after independence the founding fathers had a vision 
and a commitment to poverty alleviation in this country, which was then considered 
among the poorest countries in the world.  
 
They established the permanent presidential commission, which was responsible for 
localisation and training of citizens with the mandate of accelerating the process.  
Many citizens who are holding high position today either in the government or private 
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sector benefited from that initiative. It can be said that the initiatives were good steps 
in the right direction. 
  
Chapter 1: A brief background of Botswana’s construction industry since 
independence. It also highlights schemes and policies government has 
implemented as a bid to assist citizen contractors to build their 
capabilities in order to compete in the open market. 
 
Chapter 2:  Literature review to establish successful small contractor development 
programmes undertaken in various developing countries (especially in 
Africa) which can be considered as examples for other developing 
countries and be compared with Botswana’s programmes or 
interventions.  
 
Chapter 3:  Methodology  
This study has adopted qualitative analysis method, existing data was 
analysed in order to discern and establish meaningful interpretation of 
objectives and goals. 
 
Chapter 4:  Research Results based on evaluation of citizen preferential schemes 
implementation guidelines and data analysis of project performance 
executed by citizen contractors under those preference policies. 
 
Chapter 5:  Conclusions and Recommendations 
  
Conclusions are drawn from issues discussed on previous chapters, 
recommendations made for implementation consideration, and areas of 
further study are stated.   
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CHAPTER 2: Literature Review on Small Contractor Development (Part One) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter of literature review the role and importance of small (indigenous) 
contractor in the socio-economic development of a country, and the need for 
emerging contractor development programme in developing countries are discussed. 
Institutional, organisational and human resource developments are also discussed. 
The framework of this research on construction industry in general with a focus on 
Building Sector and is based upon the work of United Nations Centre for Human 
settlements (UNCHS) and the work of McCutcheon who has written extensively 
about labour-intensive construction which is also a sector of the construction industry. 
 
2.2 Small Contractor Development 
 
Many writers have cited that construction industry in general plays a very important 
role in the socio-economic development of every country. The building and 
infrastructure facility projects undertaken by Governments and other developers 
make such developments possible, while contributing directly to this growth itself and 
stimulating activities in several sectors to which it is linked (UNCHS, 1996; page xi-
xiii). According to Ofori, UNCHS is among the few researchers who have tried to look 
beyond the problems by the construction industry in the developing countries to 
identify and study the factors that lie at their roots (Ofori, 1993; page 16).  
 
Small businesses have been advocated as an important means of generating 
employment. It has been observed that they generate more employment per unit of 
expenditure than large companies. For example, in South Africa a noted scenario 
forecaster for a major mining company has not just argued for the importance of 
small enterprises with respect to employment generation. It has categorically stated 
that neither government nor big business can do so (McCutcheon and Taylor 
Parkins, 2003; page 317). 
 
According to Croswell and McCutcheon (2001; page 641-652), development of small 
contractors for the construction industry has been advocated and explored in two 
different contexts in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since the late 1970’s it has been advocated 
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in relation to the industry as a whole. In the late 1980’s it has been pursued in 
relation to the employment-intensive construction and maintenance of infrastructure, 
particularly low-cost, low-volume rural roads and other civil infrastructure. 
 
Croswell & McCutcheon (2001; page 641-652) state that, the investigation of Sub-
Sahara experience suggested that lessons learned from study on each context 
should be incorporated into future programmes of small contracts development and 
employment generation. Time, cost and resources are pre-requisite for measurable 
results to be achieved. It is essential to link substantial training to provision of 
infrastructure through a long-term programme approach to development, first outline 
the arguments that have been put forward for the development of small contractors in 
the construction industry as a whole in Sub-Saharan Africa. Secondly, they provide a 
sketch of the employment-intensive content within which it is deemed important, even 
essential to introduce it to small contractor’s development in sub-Sahara Africa within 
the construction industry as a whole. 
 
The origins of small contractors develop stemmed from two major concerns: 
(i) Lack of local indigenous contractors 
(ii) The dominant presence of large expatriate contractors 
 
The main objective was to generate local entrepreneurial capability.    
At the time various difficulties were identified which opposed the formation and 
success of small contractors. These included a shortage or complete lack of the 
following:  
 
• Capital 
• Expertise: entrepreneurial, managerial, technical and administrative skills 
• A track record 
  
Even after these deficiencies were overcome, the smaller contractor faced other 
difficulties including the following: 
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• An inability to provide sureties, raise insurance cover and obtain professional 
indemnity. 
• A lack of resources for large or complex projects. 
• The contracts were invariably packaged in such a way as to virtually exclude 
small contractors. 
• An inadequate approach and insufficient knowledge, time and experience 
required for the whole process of finding possibilities for work, and once found, 
insufficient understanding of the contract documentation and the preparation 
and submission of tenders. 
• Inadequate technical, administrative and managerial skills required for the 
implementation of a project. 
• The lack of continuity in relation to type, scale and location of work. 
 
According to Ofori (1993; page xi) for over forty years many writers have suggested 
various ways and means of improving the construction industry of the developing 
countries. Its has been observed that no matter what approach is chosen and 
regardless of the circumstances in which it is applied, the inter-related nature of the 
varied aspects of construction implies that the co-ordination, monitoring and review of 
any measures or programmes for improving the construction industry are of utmost 
importance. A central agency that administers the continuous development of the 
construction industry appears necessary in each country, and for the developing 
countries, such an agency is crucial.   
 
In many countries the construction sector is surrounded by serious difficulties, 
including import dependency, shortages of semi-skilled and skilled labour, a low 
degree of local participation in contracting, inadequate production of building 
materials lack of capital, equipment and tools and poor quality of management and 
supervision. These problems are often aggravated by the adoption of designs, 
technologies and standards that are inappropriate to conditions. Thus, it can be 
concluded that in the majority of developing countries, the construction sector is not 
fulfilling its potential positive role in the development process (UNCHS, 1982; page 1)   
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Ofori observed that UNCHS has depicted the same problems another way, that in 
developing countries, construction projects were often subjected to long delays and 
increased costs. The contributing factors to this state of affairs were: difficulty in 
obtaining tenders; inefficiency in planning design and construction; difficulty in 
obtaining vital resources – materials, equipment and skilled personnel – and their 
high costs; poor estimating and financial planning; inappropriate tendering and 
contractual procedures; and inefficient on-site construction. 
Construction tended to act as a drain on the foreign-exchange reserves of most 
developing countries, as some 30 per cent of total output (and 60 per cent of 
materials) comprised imported inputs. The local construction industries were 
generally insufficiently developed. Indigenous contractors undertook the smallest 
projects and lacked the necessary technical and managerial expertise, although they 
might be good entrepreneurs. The production of materials was generally 
undeveloped. The items produced also had a low quality (Ofori, 1993a; page 15) 
  
Further, Croswell and McCutcheon (2001; page 641-652) state that since the late 
1970’s two major approaches have been applied to overcome these obstacles. 
The first approach focused upon the management and operation of the contracting 
company itself. This resulted in a great deal of literature production about almost 
every aspect of the management of a company with insufficient attention being paid 
to the entrepreneurial aspects of contracting in particular, the need to identify those 
people with entrepreneurial capability, and who are prepared to take risks through 
psychometric testing and the subsequent fostering of potential entrepreneurs. 
The second approach has focused upon policies and regulations which would at best 
foster the growth of small contractors or at least temper the obstacles to their 
formation and operation. 
 
Central to both approaches has been to the development of successful, profit-making 
companies. Recently there has been some rhetoric regarding the importance of 
social benefits, such as local development, community participation and employment 
generation from the perspective that small firms generate more employment than 
large ones. In South Africa special attention has been given to empowerment through 
the provision of opportunities to previously disadvantaged groups by way of tender 
preferences and “unbundling” the packaging of large contracts in such a way as to 
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enable the participation of small contractors and improve their access to components 
of the projects. 
 
Despite all these efforts, it has been realised that small contractor development still 
emphasises the same set of problems that were identified over twenty years ago, 
such as lack of continuity of work that has tended to be replaced by “the lack of 
sustainability” (McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins, 2003; page 324). 
  
2.3  Important Role of a Small Contractor in Developing Countries  
 
The majority of the population of most developing countries are poor and unskilled, 
even in countries that may be considered as middle income with extensive 
infrastructure development projects. Infrastructure development has proven to be a 
source of a sustainable poverty alleviation and employment creation. In developing 
countries, construction industry is mainly controlled by foreigners, who are primarily 
not concerned about employment creation and poverty alleviation, but rather to 
maximise profit. They utilise mechanical equipment or employ foreign skilled labour 
to achieve their objective. 
 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) play a very important role in the 
construction industry of developing countries by creating employment and economic 
opportunities and thus provide socio-economic benefits. It is therefore imperative that 
small contractors be developed to a level where they will effectively manage their 
business from the perspective of sustainability, which ultimately contributes to the 
socio-economic development of local communities and society at large (Ofori, 1993; 
page 15) 
 
Dlungwana and Rwelamila (2004; page 1-12) argue that it is important therefore to 
have a clearly focussed development programme that entails the provision of 
assistance to contractors in developing their skills, knowledge and competencies in 
such a manner that will enable them to operate their enterprises on a sustainable 
basis. The process of development needs assessment in order to achieve continuous 
improvement in each contractor’s performance.  There are strong indications to 
suggest that the effective development of small and medium-sized contractors can 
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have a huge impact on socio-economic development and better management of the 
environment for developing countries.  Additional benefits can also be realised, such 
as increased spending in the country’s economy by local contractors, a growing 
entrepreneurship base of the country’s citizens and improved delivery of 
infrastructure.  When there is an abundance of SME talent it could become easier to 
speed up economic development and employment creation. 
 
UNCHS (1996; page2) hints that the role the construction industry plays in socio-
economic development is very essential to developing countries. It makes direct 
contribution to growth like sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing and services 
and indirectly it provides the basis upon which other sectors can grow, by 
constructing the physical facilities required for the production and distribution of 
goods and services.  Small contractors undertake the smaller and simpler 
construction projects, invariably using labour-intensive methods. The role of 
construction industry in the socio-economic development is shown by figure 1 below. 
The importance of small contractors have been cited by many writers as a reason for 
obtaining sufficient number of indigenous contractors. 
 
UNCHS (1996; page 37) defines small contractor as the only firms willing and able to 
undertake the small, scattered projects, especially in rural areas, which are among 
the key components of development and which are required to satisfy the basic 
needs of the people such as housing, heath facilities, sanitation and geographical 
mobility. The problems that are experienced by small contractors in developing 
countries prohibit countries deriving the benefits that the nature of construction 
activity and its linkage effects can offer as depicted on figure 1.  
 
Soweto major urban civil works project that was incorporated into a small-contractor 
development programme, revealed that community-based construction undertaken 
by small firms compared with the conventional construction in terms of cost was 6-15 
per cent less expensive for upgrading of secondary water mains; 16-19 per cent 
cheaper for installation of low voltage cables; and of similar cost for upgrading of 
roads using water-bound macadam. 30-65 per cent of the expenditure was retained 
in the community. A number of job opportunities and skills transfer were created by 
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the projects, local community were taught commercial, administrative, managerial 
and technical skills (UNCHS, 1996; page 3).   
 
 
Figure 2.1 Construction in development 
Source: Ofori 1994 
 
Construction industry provides the physical infrastructure throughout developing 
countries into isolated rural communities, and thus creating employment for the local 
population and lead to their social upliftment.  As small contractors undertake most of 
the projects in rural areas, they are important vehicle for the socio-economic 
development of these areas. Programmes of rural and community development can 
be used to upgrade small contractors (UNCHS, 1996; page 4) 
Distribution of 
materials and 
equipment 
Producer of 
infrastructure utilities 
e.g. roads, bridges, ports 
Producer of capital 
production and 
services items e.g. 
factories, hotels, offices 
Production of 
materials and 
equipment e.g. 
cement, bricks, paints 
Producer of social and 
administrative facilities 
e.g. schools, hospitals, public 
offices, civic centres 
Production of goods 
and services in the 
entire economy 
Movement of goods 
and people, supply of 
utilities e.g. water, gas 
Rise in living standards 
Socio-
economic 
development 
Provision of 
financial services 
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Figure 2.2 Factors giving impetus to contractor development 
Source: Ofori 1985 
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UNCHS (1996; page 5) states that Ofori observed that over the past decades many 
developing countries have implemented initiatives to improve the performance of 
local construction contracting firms, either as part of, or in isolation from, 
comprehensive programmes for improving the construction industry. Figure 2 outlines 
factors that give impetus to contractor-development. The attempts to resolve other 
construction problems, such as acute shortage of materials that development of local 
construction materials was intended to address, have failed to succeed. 
   
Since the 1970’s, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has been advocating 
for the development of national construction capacity and the dissemination of 
construction management knowledge and skills. The ILO Construction Management 
Programme has been aligned with the infrastructure programmes and effective 
utilisation of locally available human and material resources (ILO, 1993b; page 1). 
 
In the early 1970’s the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) supported the 
United Kingdom based Intermediate Technology Development Group to start 
management training for owners and managers of contracting firms in newly 
independent developing countries. The demand for the assistance grew rapidly and 
thus required a larger organisation with greater resources and more international 
links. The ILO with its highly reputable general Management Development 
Programmes and special interest in the development of small construction 
enterprises seized the opportunity and started to promote programmes that assist the 
development of indigenous construction industries in member countries.  The 
development of programmes was implemented in three distinct phases (ILO, 1993b; 
page 1) 
 
1. Exploration of needs and priorities; development of pilot training material. 
2. Pilot regional programmes, including seminars and workshops to discuss 
experiences, formulate strategies, and test out and publish training materials. 
3. Institutional building, primarily through the design and implementation of 
national technical cooperation projects. 
 
The exploratory phase brought out the appreciation of the importance of small 
contractor enterprises. The Government of Norway agreed to support the ILO for the 
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African Region to provide basic capability for delivering management training to 
small-scale building contractors. The second phase included an examination of the 
policy constraints, which adversely affected the performance of domestic construction 
industries in developing countries. The third phase involved the policy constraints that 
adversely affected small contractors, and it became clear that more efforts were 
needed towards institution building in order to achieve suitable sectorial development 
(ILO, 1993b; page 1).  
 
It has been observed that the above three phases are lacking in the Botswana 
building construction industry. This report attempts to highlight these critical 
deficiencies of the current schemes and policies for small (citizen) contractors 
development. It has been noted that in the three phases, there are factors that are 
necessary for sustainable small contractor development programmes such as: 
 
(a) Training of owners and managers in both technical and managerial skills. 
 
(b) Examination of policy constraints that adversely affect the performance of 
domestic contractors, and that means Government policies should be 
formulated to assist development of local contractors and organisational 
capacity building. 
 
(c) The necessity for institutional building in both central and local government in 
order to achieve sustainable development. 
 
There are various ranges of construction management training systems today in the 
market.  The ILO is one of the first international organisations to develop such a 
programme called Construction Management Programme (CMP), which can be 
divided into five categories. This report will focus on one category, which is “Improve 
Your Construction Business.” The CMP derived its experience from an earlier ILO 
Programme – IYB or “Improve Your Business” (ILO, 1993a; page 2). IYB consists of 
self- teaching material that introduces the user to basic management techniques 
such as business analysis, financial analysis and activity financial planning. This 
programme proved very successful in assisting small traders and manufacturers of 
simple products. However, this programme was not adequate for catering for the 
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specialized needs of small construction enterprises (ILO, 1993a, page 2). Then CMP 
utilised its experience from the IYB programme and developed a system that would 
meet the specific needs of small contractors called IYCB “(Improve Your Construction 
Business)”. This programme was first tried in Ghana, at the request of the 
Government of Ghana for the ILO to improve the performance of local construction in 
Ghana. 
 
It is quite interesting to note that many small–scale contracting firms in Ghana 
claimed to be capable of implementing basic building and infrastructure projects, but 
failed to deliver quality work at reasonable cost and time, which is a similar case in 
Botswana where citizens are continually awarded development projects under 
preferential schemes and they fail to deliver. It is noteworthy to highlight that in 
Ghana, clients, consultants and contractors realised the fact that small contractors 
required assistance and the Government of the Netherlands was approached to 
support an ILO-executed “Improve Your Construction Business” and again the ILO 
emphasised institutional support to ensure sustainability, so the project team 
identified ten major problems which are experienced by Ghanaian building 
contractors: (ILO, 1993a; page 3) 
 
1. Contractual Procedures 
2. Inadequate market opportunities 
3. Financing the work 
4. Obtaining performance bonds 
5. Site operations 
6. Quality control 
7. Availability of plans 
8. Lack of skilled labour 
9. Manufacturers problems 
10. Getting paid   
 
It is apparent that indigenous small contractors in developing countries experience 
similar major problems, but the difference is the conditions and environment of 
operations. For example, in Ghana inadequate market opportunities and financing 
have been identified as some of the major constraints, but the Botswana government 
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ensures that citizen contractors are awarded projects through preferential schemes 
and also provides 15% of the value of the project in advance as a mobilisation loan.   
 
The Ghana IYCB project discovered that the way in which the contractors conducted 
their business failed to deliver quality products within budget and designated 
completion periods. Therefore contractors required training in order to improve their 
business performance.  The IYCB designed eight successive sessions on estimating 
and tendering to enable each participant to produce a model of the bidding process 
for his or her own business environment, which comprised the following: 
 
• The participants take measurements and notes during a site visit, then: 
• Prepare their own simple working drawings and site layout, then: 
• Produce a basic set of standard specifications, and; 
• Design a simple contract, then with the working drawings: 
• Prepare a list of quantities which allows them to: 
• Calculate direct project cost, and then to: 
• Estimate indirect project cost, and finally: 
• Prepare a quotation or bid 
 
Estimating and tendering are very important activities for small contractors, if not for 
the entire construction industry because of fierce competition, when profit margins 
are low and a small mistake on pricing a tender document can make all the difference 
between a worthwhile profit and a serious loss (ILO, 1993a; page 3).   
 
 
2.4 Challenges Facing Small Contractors in Developing Countries 
 
In the construction industry in developing countries (especially Africa), small and 
medium-sized contractors need support in order to overcome specific challenges and 
to contribute to sustainable building in respective industries. According to Dlungwana 
and Rwelamila (2004; page 1-12), the following are some of the challenges.  
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• As a result of globalisation of economies, the poor state of the SME 
construction sector in many African countries renders the SME sector highly 
vulnerable to foreign competition. The absence of regulation, institutions and 
resources to support it is at the core of this challenge. In many African countries 
the capacity of this sector to deliver on domestic infrastructure projects has 
been severely depleted following the collapse of many contractors.  
• There is often a lack of comprehensive models, programmes and tools to assist 
in contractor development in terms of, inter alia, assessment of training and 
mentoring. Where they exist, the programmes are often haphazard and 
unstructured, hampering the contractor’s development effort instead of helping 
it. 
• Lack of a balance between sustainable building trade-offs, for example the 
creation of jobs using local labour, has an impact on the quality of construction 
products due to high labour turnover. Quality can also vary due to the difference 
in the work ethic and skills levels in different geographical locations. 
• Many contractors and other participants in the economy consider the creation of 
economic value (e.g. company profits) above environmental aspects (e.g. 
depletion of the ozone layer and forests) and social issues (e.g. the well-being 
of workers). 
 
The above stipulated challenges are among others that require urgent attention from 
various stakeholders, particularly government and other public sector organisations 
involved in development projects and have great influence in the construction 
industry.  A starting point for many construction industries in developing countries 
must be to address industry constraints at a basic level by developing the 
management skills of local contractors to deliver effectively on local projects. For 
example, developing countries should adopt national educational and training 
strategies, which set achievable targets for raising participation levels among young 
people and which make a strong commitment to adequate and sustainable 
investment in human resource development.  While not all SMEs will thrive and 
become successful, some will emerge to become sustainable and globally 
competitive enterprises. An important balance should however always be maintained 
between three key sustainable building objectives, i.e. social development, economic 
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development and responsible management of the environment (Dlungwana and 
Rwelamila 2004; page 2). 
 
Notwithstanding widespread acceptance of the importance of sustainable small 
contractors by many countries in the developing world and the fact that some 
countries have been successful, small contractor development remains an enigma to 
many Governments. For small contractor development to be successful, it should not 
involve only government officials, but all stakeholders and communities in order to 
address environmental and socio-economic problems with defined objectives 
(McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins 2001; page 317- 320). It has been revealed that the 
adoption of a well planned national programme on small contractor development and 
the increase in the visibility of a variety of sustainable building initiatives will help 
bring about the necessary understanding, learning and skills transfer in the 
construction industry, particularly in developing countries.  
 
However, ILO statistics have also revealed that despite robust economic growth, the 
global employment situation improved only slightly in 2004 (Paratian, 2005; page 1). 
Employment creation remains a major challenge for policy makers. Decent work 
“deficits” still need to be eliminated, especially in the growing informal economy in 
many developing countries, as well as achieving a fairer globalisation and resolving 
the high youth unemployment if the situation is to improve. In most African countries, 
unemployment, under employment and poverty levels have continued to increase or 
have remained at extremely high levels despite considerable effort to promote 
sustainable development by African countries and international development 
agencies over the last 30 years. This calls for the need to   recognize the centrality of 
employment as one of the major means to alleviate poverty and empower people to 
be part of the social, economic and political processes.  
  
2.5 Selection of Participating Contractors for Development Programme     
 
Selection of contractors to participate in small contractor development programmes is 
crucial; it ensures long-term commitment in the industry by those who are taking part. 
For instance, in Lesotho all citizen contractors that expressed interest on Lesotho’s 
20 years long-term development plan has to undergo assessment to determine their 
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background in contracting or other construction related fields (ILO, 1993b; page 9). At 
present in Botswana many small (citizen) contractors are emerging simply because 
of lucrative preferential schemes which government is providing to assist capacity 
building of citizen contractors (citizen empowerment).  However, selection criteria of 
contractors vary from country to country depending on whom the programme is 
targeting.   
 
The report now reviews selection criteria of the ILO’s IYCB project employed in 
Ghana, Lesotho and Kenya.     
 
In Ghana most of the small contractors identified for training at the inception of the 
project were already involved in the execution of road works using heavy machinery.  
Therefore these contractors had some knowledge of construction. The criteria for 
selecting contractors took into consideration the following factors: 
 
• Contractor’s ownership of Equipment; 
• Contractor’s fixed assets; 
• Supervisory Capacity of the contractor, for example the education/ training 
background of staff;  
• Experience of the firm in road works; 
• Educational background of the Managing Director. 
 
In Kenya, advertisements were placed in the three daily papers targeting districts and 
64 companies registered their interest in the training programme. Small-scale 
contractors were identified with assistance from the Ministries of Works and 
Transport representatives in the respective districts. After reviewing qualification 
criteria data, only 24 firms were short-listed, and 12 contract managers from these 
firms were selected for training (ILO, 1993b; page 12).    
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2.6 Replication of the “Improve Your Construction Business” (IYCB) Project 
in Other Countries 
 
In Ghana the IYCB approach proved to have worked well after three years in use, 
and a number of African countries showed interest in using this methodology to 
increase the productivity of their local construction industries.  Some proposals 
resulted in concrete initiatives. A pilot project, testing the validity of the IYCB concept 
in Kenya was evaluated to determine whether a full-scale intervention was feasible. A 
similar test was undertaken in Malawi and a project to apply the IYCB concept to the 
development of labour-based road maintenance contractors in Lesotho started in 
April 1993 (ILO, 1993b; page 3-4).   
Lesotho, like most developing countries initiated labour-based road construction and 
maintenance programmes in 1977 with two primary objectives: i) to promote efficient 
use of labour-based construction methods in Lesotho and ii) to create as much 
gainful employment as possible. It has since grown into a substantial organisation 
with more than 260 support staff and a manual labour force of approximately 1800 
responsible for routine and periodic maintenance of about 700 km of gravel road. The 
Lesotho construction industry (just like in many developing countries) was dominated 
by foreign and non-Basotho, local-based contractors. There were no domestic 
contractors specializing in roads and civil construction and domestic building 
contractors were poorly capitalized and lacked essential managerial business skills. 
The development project was based on a step-by-step approach helping contractors 
to take advantage of relevant market opportunities. The suitable market for labour-
based road maintenance is one that offers potential growth and an opportunity for 
domestic contractors to develop the basic business and technical skills that will be 
needed if they are to take a larger share of the civil works (ILO, 1993b; page 3-5). 
 
2.7 Small Contractor Development Models  
 
As stated previously, there is a wide range of Contractor Development Models 
(CDMs) that have been developed by many international organisations. This report 
will only highlight the key features of Contractor Development Models without 
discussing any CDMs in detail. According to Dlungwana and Rwelamila, contractor 
development models are more likely to achieve their goal if they are driven in 
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conjunction with a broader, long-term industry framework with which they share 
similar development goals. In order to contribute effectively and exert an influence on 
sustainable building, CDMs should be properly structured and supported. The 
following characteristics are considered as key features of the models (Dlungwana 
and Rwelamila, 2004; page 4): 
 
• The models should aim to develop contractors’ technical and management 
capacity over a sustained development period with a view to encouraging the 
competitiveness and growth of contractors. There must be a clear development 
path along which contractors will progress.  
• The models should integrate the developmental activities of all stakeholders, 
from government to private sector.  Procurement, training, mentorship and 
performance assessment activities are well integrated and complementary. In 
other words, the model should encourage partnering in all aspects of contractor 
development. 
• The models should become an integral part of the entire industry development 
strategy and should be strongly championed. 
• The models should be flexible enough to accommodate varying needs of 
contractors at different levels of development. 
• The models should promote the adoption of best industry practices and be 
supported by excellent research practices in order to create and share 
knowledge. 
 
Key processes in the functioning of a typical model are centred around the need 
to focus development efforts on small and medium-sized contractors. In brief, 
these processes involve: 
 
• Contractor selection and registration: to ensure that the right type of 
contractors participate in delivering construction products; 
• Training and mentoring: to ensure that entrepreneurs gain a basic 
capability to manage their enterprises on a sustainable basis; 
• Continuous contractor performance assessment, improvement and 
grading: to ensure that contractors become competitive in providing 
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construction goods. Continuous grading validates the changing status 
levels of contractors as performance improves or deteriorates.  
 
Ultimately, a successful Small Contractor development programme requires an 
integrated contractor development approach that places development models and 
the cultural values of organisations and industries at the centre for development effort 
to yield tangible improvement in the economies of developing countries, with socio- 
economic benefits. 
 
According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2002; page 1-9) 
Employment Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP) or Private Sector Development, 
an increased focus on labour-intensive construction and maintenance techniques in 
the development of the local contracting industry may significantly improve upon the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the operations, and at the same time, decrease 
poverty through increased employment creation and income generation. Work carried 
out by the ILO has shown that the constraints on the use of labour-intensive 
techniques by the private sector have more to do with the general problems faced by 
small-scale contractors than with any basic difficulty with the techniques themselves. 
This has a significant bearing on how one should foster the proper development of a 
local construction industry. When changing public executed operations to private 
sector implementation, the client must seriously consider these issues and address 
them through a programme approach to create an enabling environment. 
In order to develop local capacity in the construction sector, all stakeholders including 
contractors, consultants and public servants, must understand fully the objective of 
the programme or intervention policy in order that they may set out organisational or 
departmental goals and strategies to attain them. It is very important to review the 
environment in which they operate. This includes the capacity and ability of the client 
organisations to cope with their new and changed role as contract managers. For 
small-scale contractors, creating an enabling environment includes removal of 
barriers to their entry into the market, and to their growth and sustainability (ILO, 
2004a; page 1). 
25 
Without compromising on the demands of the finished product, the ILO has 
successfully demonstrated in a number of countries the viability of private sector 
executed labour-intensive programmes. These programmes include training and 
capacity building at various levels in both the public and private sectors, in labour-
intensive technologies and in business and contract management.  
The real challenge now being faced by governments is to facilitate real market driven 
growth and competition for the construction industry. This means setting up 
programmes and incentives to encourage the domestic private sector to be a viable 
option to the government driven contracting.  These programmes should provide 
education and training that render individuals employable and help them gain access 
to a decent job, thus escaping poverty and marginalization. For this to happen, 
contractor associations and construction councils must take on responsibility for 
developing structured training and mentorship programmes and be fully professional 
and self-funding operators where possible (ILO, 2004c; page1 ). 
 
All successful large-scale programmes have been linked to long-term, in-house 
training programmes. For example, in 1980, Botswana under the Ministry of Local 
Government, Lands and Housing established a District Road Improvement and 
Maintenance programme. After an initial implementation period with demonstration 
and training in Serowe, the programme expanded gradually to cover all nine districts 
in the country, employing 3200 casual labourers. A Field Training Unit was set up in 
Molepolole in 1985. This training unit is organized as a part of the Roads Training 
Centre under the Roads Department of the Ministry of Works, Transport and 
Communications. During the first years of the programme, the ILO was responsible 
for both programme management and training, but it subsequently focussed on 
labour-intensive technology training at the Field Training Unit. This included the 
further development of labour-intensive technology and in particular the introduction 
of effective systems and procedures for routine road maintenance. The ILO provided 
technical assistance and advisory services to the programme from its inception until 
1995 with several experts funded from different sources (the World Bank, NORAD 
and Sida) (ILO, 1996; page 1). This indicates that when a programme is established 
with all fundamental aspects, such as training and institutional capacity can be 
successful. 
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During the period 1998 to 2000 the Botswana Roads Department with ILO assistance 
was involved in a NORAD supported project entitled “Application of Labour-intensive 
Methods in Maintenance and Construction”. Intrinsic to this component and the Road 
Department’s policy of outsourcing works, was increased use of labour-intensive and 
support to the development of the domestic contracting capacity. During the eighth 
National Development Plan (NDP8) which was implemented between 1997 and 
2003, increasing shares of all contracts were tailored for labour-intensive methods to 
be executed by small to medium scale citizen contractors to facilitate their entry into 
and establishment in the market (ILO, 1996; page 1). 
The ILO provided advisory and monitoring support to the Roads department for the 
application of labour-intensive methods in road maintenance and construction by: 
 
• Giving advice on project planning and management and reviewing factors 
influencing the contracting environment including the sustainability of contract 
documents; 
• Conducting regular technical audits on both subcomponents (maintenance and 
construction) as regards systems and procedure as well as contract execution; 
• Participating in the Task Force (reference group for all stakeholders) meeting as 
a regular member. 
 
In seeking to develop local capacity in the construction sector, i.e. contractors as well 
as consultants, it will be important to look at the environment in which they operate. 
This includes the capacity and ability of the client organisations to cope with their new 
and changed role as contract managers.  
 
2.8 Lessons Learned from Various Contractor Development Programmes. 
In 1995 the ILO (1999; page 17-20) commissioned a six African nation facts finding 
study to look at the various similarities and differences within the contractor 
development programmes with the objectives of highlighting common issues and 
problems. South Africa was included for the first time in the study because its 
development of labour-based technology in construction had already taken up 
prominent status in the country’s policy directives and regulations targeting 
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procurement procedures. 
The study was intended to be the first phase of an overall objective to produce a 
guidelines document to assist and encourage those who are involved in this 
technology and in the development of the private sector. Towards the end of 1995, at 
a workshop in Zimbabwe a decision was taken to proceed with what was proposed to 
be a 2-volume document covering institutional and operational issues.  
Project experiences in various countries were assessed.  Those countries included 
Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Lesotho and South Africa. The ILO study revealed 
that more has been achieved at the political level in South Africa than in other 
countries in terms of decisions regarding adoption and utilisation of public sector 
procurement as an instrument of social policy. Labour-Based technology is 
encouraged and supported wherever possible through specific measures of targeted 
procurement, which aims to provide employment and business opportunities for the 
marginalized individuals and communities. South Africa has formulated direct 
preference policies that assign small contracts to target enterprises, and on large 
contracts tenderers compete on the basis of both the product and the process with 
resource specifications being used to define social objectives and their associated 
acceptance criteria. The study report goes on to state that even at its early stage the 
policy proved to be successful in correcting uneven wealth distribution and in 
addressing poverty alleviation and employment creation.  More importantly, it has 
gained wide acceptance within the construction industry and has moved labour-
based technology from an orientation to a national programme basis (ILO, 1999; 
page 17-18). 
Since November 1997 South Africa’s Department of public works started an 
extensive process to address the challenges of growth, performance, improvement, 
delivery and transformation in the construction industry. Throughout the process the 
public and private sectors were involved in the formulation of a common industry 
development strategy, and the planning and legislation that defines the role of the 
Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) in driving the strategy to 
implementation (GOVZA, 1999; page 6-20). 
According to the CSIR Building and Construction Technology, the 1997 Green Paper 
entitled “Creating an Enabling Environment for Reconstruction, Growth and 
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Development in the Construction Industry”, identified some of the challenges facing 
the industry, including: declining construction demand and the volatile nature of the 
demand; falling construction productivity and output quality; regulatory impediments 
to industry performance; participation of SMEs and the previously marginalized 
sector; public sector capacity to manage delivery; performance improvement of the 
South African industry. This prompted an extensive stakeholder consultation, 
resulting in the White Paper, which was published in 1998 establishing an enabling 
framework within which the construction industry can play a more strategic role in 
social development and economic growth. The framework has provided the basis for 
an integrated industrial development strategy and the institutional mechanism to drive 
such a strategy on behalf of all stakeholders (CSIR, 2001; page 1-3).  
 
It is very important to note that the 1997 Green Paper called specifically for the 
establishment of a Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB). An Inter-
ministerial Task Team was set up with the main objective of establishing the 
Construction Industry Development Board.  For a period of three years the Task 
Team played a crucial role in assembling the capacity of all role players towards 
concrete deliverables of strategic objectives. Finally in April 2001, the Construction 
Industry Development Board was formally established. This was attained through 
formation of a Reference Group and several Focus Groups, interactions with 
individuals, community and practitioners within the public sector. More importantly, 
the Task Team concluded that the inclusive involvement of a wide range of expertise 
had identified and developed capacity to promote construction industry development 
in South Africa. The human resource constitutes a vital asset in challenges facing the 
new Construction Industry Development Board (CSIR, 2001; page 3-5).       
Ofori (1993; page 3) suggest that construction industries of the developing countries 
can be disaggregated in many ways, one possible approach is by the classification of 
the various types of projects the sub-sectors undertake and requirements of such for 
design and construction expertise, various other construction resources and 
administration considerations.  The developing countries require a very wide range of 
constructed goods to achieve their socio-economic development objectives. 
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Ofori (1993; page 4) state that Drewer suggested that the more appropriate 
subdivision would be into the international, large-national, medium-national and 
small-national sub-sectors. Ofori proposed an alternative system with two main 
divisions:  formal and informal. For projects in the formal sector, designs are 
generally prepared and planning and building design approval obtained.  Projects in 
the informal sector are mainly in the rural areas and the unauthorised settlements on 
the fringes of the centres.  Construction in this sector is not constrained by statutory 
regulations, or codes of practices.  Wither see the informal sector of the construction 
industry as having great potential, not only as a means of meeting the countries 
construction needs, but also for upgrading each country’s entire construction 
industry.  It is also seen as a vehicle for dispersing economic activity and raising the 
income levels of citizens.  According to Ofori (1993; page 5), the United Nations 
Centre for Human Settlements suggests that Government should reformulate policies 
for the integrated promotion and development of the indigenous construction sector, 
placing emphasis on the potential of the informal sector as a matter of priority in order 
to formulate ways and means of ensuring its promotion and growth. 
 
How can growth be measured in a contractor development programme?  According 
Ofori (1993; page 13) says that UNCHS suggested a set of indicator that could be 
used to evaluate the extent to which the construction industry of any country is 
fulfilling its potential: 
 
• The extent to which the construction project in a country’s development plan 
are implemented on time and within budget; 
 
• The percentage of imports of materials, tools and equipment and skilled 
human resources in total construction output; 
 
• The degree of local participation in contracting, or the development of the local 
construction industry; 
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• The degree of development of the local building materials industries, including 
the quality and availability of local materials and costs and degree of 
protection of local industry; 
 
• The overall efficiency/productivity of the construction sector as measured by 
cost per unit of output.  Ofori adds that by any of these above indicators, the 
construction industries in many of developing countries fare badly. 
2.9 Contractor Development Initiatives 
 
Ofori (1993; page 50) has observed that the approach to the development of 
indigenous contractors differ from one country to another.  Many developing 
countries have formulated entry barriers to protect their infant industry against foreign 
firms.  The contractor development plans are often accompanied by some forms of 
protection for locally owned firms. 
 
Ofori (1993; page 49) recorded that Davis, Belfield and Everest give an account of 
some of the statutes regulations in this regard in various countries.  For example, 
Thailand forbids foreigners to practice as professional architects or engineers.  In the 
Philippines, indigenous contracting companies and those that Filipinos are majority 
shareholders of at least 70 per cent are given a 15 per cent preference margin in 
bidding only for projects above certain floor limit. 
2.10 Contractor Development Agencies 
Many developing countries mostly in Africa have established Contractor-
Development Agencies (CDA) in order to provide a comprehensive package of 
assistance figure 3 that includes; 
 
• Project-related finance on soft terms which is either disbursed directly by the 
agency or through selected financial institutions; 
• Construction projects obtained either as a result of the agency guaranteeing 
that the contractor would perform satisfactory and/or helping the company to 
submit a realistic tender, or the agency tendering for, or being offered, a 
number (usually public) projects which are then allocated to the contractors; 
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• Training on subjects such as tendering, contract scheduling and 
administration, site supervision, and general financial management; 
managerial advice is offered as an extension service; 
• Supply of key construction materials which are either procured in bulk by the 
agency, or purchased by the companies from suppliers under special prices 
and terms arranged by the agencies; and 
• Items of plant and equipment may be lent, or offered on hire-purchase terms, 
to contractors. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Key Functions of contractor-development agencies 
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Ofori (1993; page 51) reported that, The National Construction Corporation of Kenya 
was established in 1967 by Government with technical and financial support from the 
Norwegian Overseas Aid Agency.  It was the first and largest contractor support 
agency in Africa in terms of number of firms supported, size of the revolving fund, 
and range of services offered.  It got involved in the manufacture of construction 
materials and it proposed to develop itself into a bank and construction management 
consultancy organisation, and set up a contracting organisation to demonstrate 
modern technical and managerial techniques to its contractor beneficiaries and to 
generate income to support its activities.  In 1989 the NCC was abolished by the 
Government of Kenya after contractors complained that it was competing with them 
for projects. 
 
The Botswana Enterprises Development Unit (BEDU) and The Swazi Enterprises 
Development Corporation emulated the NCC model.  They were up with aid from a 
number of countries and external aid institutions.  However, unlike the NCC, their 
contractor-support activities were administered by Units which form part of National 
Agencies developing small-scale manufacturing enterprises.  Again, unlike the NCC 
in Kenya, the NCC agencies in Botswana and Swaziland were not administered by 
Ministries  responsible for the construction industry. 
 
These countries are still faced with a scarcity of qualified and experienced local 
personnel; the two agencies have not achieved much (Ofori 1993; page 53).  Lesotho 
is one of the countries that attempted to replicate the NCC model, which resulted in 
the formation of a sort of labour-intensive programme, the Basotho Enterprises 
Development Company discussed previously. 
Botswana can learn from South Africa’s example, of how its political will has 
influenced the mobilisation of all construction industry stakeholders and interest 
groups to establish a single National Body responsible for running and controlling 
industry issues, rather than having fragmented, ad hoc committees in various 
ministries and departments.  Successful implementation of development projects or 
government policies on citizen contractor development programmes can not be 
possible without institutional and organisational capacity based on local human 
resources. 
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2.11 Small (Citizen) Contractor Development Situation in Botswana 
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, at independence Botswana realised that construction 
industry can play an important role in the socio-economic development of the 
country, and that required full participation of citizens as contractors and 
entrepreneurs. In the early years of independence the Government established the 
Botswana Enterprises Development Unit (BEDU) under the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry to encourage local entrepreneurs to firmly establish themselves as 
producers of certain local goods and services, as well as developing a certain 
confidence in local industry in terms of competitiveness and quality. Among others 
this included the construction industry. BEDU’s advisory personnel were from SIDA 
(Swedish International Development Agency) and in addition extensive assistance 
were provided by Peace Corps and NORAD. However, effective localization 
continued to be one of the top priority objectives of the BEDU and Government.  
Local counterparts were recruited to understudy expatriates as a process of transfer 
of skills to enable localisation (ter Haar, 1976; page 3-7). 
 
In view of the above, it is apparent that BEDU programmes did not achieve its 
objectives on localisation and local entrepreneur development. In view of what 
happened with Kenya’s National Construction Corporation, this programme did not 
consolidate the entire national construction industry, and that is what might led to its 
failure. 
 
Even though it is not clear what impact the BEDU has had in terms of socio-
economic and poverty alleviation, there is no doubt that Botswana’s construction 
industry as one of the main contributors to the economy, requires major reforms and 
development in terms of human resources, institutional and organisational capacity 
building. There is no literature or policy documentation on schemes and Government 
interventions for citizen contractor development plans or programmes because 
policies came about as Presidential Directives.  
 
The existing schemes guidelines were evaluated to measure their alignment to the 
broader sense of small and medium contractor development programmes as 
34 
implemented in other developing countries. The modalities of the implementations of 
various assistance schemes by Government for citizen contractors have been 
reviewed in order to measure achievements made. 
 
Interviews were held with Senior Government officials involved in the implementation 
of the policy.  They requested a mini questionnaire to be formulated and circulated.  
This study is limited to the Ministry of Works and Transportation, Department of 
Buildings and Engineering Services, and focuses mainly on the building construction 
industry. It has been observed that at present there is no regular systematic data 
collection and recording system in place for each project at DBES, which would, 
entail monitoring and performance evaluation data.   
 
Questionnaire respondent indicated the following reasons as causes for citizen 
contractor’s failure: 
• Poor management skills that result in cost and time overrun. 
• Mobilisation advance being diverted. 
• Lack of tendering experience that result in under pricing of projects. 
• Unfavourable contract conditions, for example, fixed contract sum in an 
environment where it is impossible to predict cost of material six months in 
advance due to unpredictable cost escalations. 
• Lack of a proper contractor development programme that constitute 
performance monitoring and controlling system. In the current situation a 
contractor who abandons a project still has a privilege to tender for other 
projects and qualifies for mobilisation advance, and that becomes a vicious 
circle. 
Some respondent have suggested that government should establish a proper 
citizen contractor development with well defined objectives, set duration and 
milestones. 
 
 
2.12  Registrations and Categorisation of Contractors in Botswana 
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According to the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB), at present 
there is no specific technical skills requirement to register a building and construction 
company, especially at opportunity class Grade (OC).  However, an individual who is 
registering a company must have personnel with relevant experience in that 
particular field. 
 
Presidential Directives CAB 42 19 / 85, instructed that registration of construction 
companies should be in the following categories: 
• Grades OC, A and B are reserved for 100% citizen contractors. 
• Grade C is reserved for 100% citizen, and majority citizen owned firms. 
• Grade D is reserved for 100% citizen, majority and minority owned citizens 
firms.  
• Grade E is open to all contractors irrespective of ownership. 
 
Tables 1 to 3 indicate ceilings of grades and activities for execution by citizen 
contractors on building, electrical and mechanical scales. 
  
TABLE  2. 1: CONTRACTOR’S CEILING VALUES IN PULA, FROM 1 NOVEMBER 
2004. Source: PPADB 2004 
 
Sub 
Code 
 
Grade 
OC 
 
Grade A 
 
Grade B 
 
Grade C 
 
Grade D 
 
Grade E 
01 to 06 500,000 1,600,000 3,000,000 7,000,000 14,000,000 Unlimited  
 
 
SUB-CODES 
01 Building construction 
02 Structural steel work 
03 Pre-fabricated building 
04 Solar water heating 
05 High rise buildings 
06 Design and build 
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Table 2.2 Electrical Codes 02 
 
Sub 
Code 
 
Grade 
OC 
 
Grade A 
 
Grade B 
 
Grade C 
 
Grade D 
 
Grade E 
01 to 13 70,000 200,000 400,000 900,000 2,000,000 Unlimited  
 
SUB CODES 
01 General installations 
02 overhead low-tension reticulations 
03 overhead high tension reticulations 
04 high-tension sub-station works 
05 power-generating systems 
06 fire detection systems 
07 earthing and lightning protection 
08 machinery and control systems 
09 security systems 
10 lifts, hoists and escalators 
11 photovoltaic systems 
12 airfield lighting 
13 electrical fencing 
 
Source: PPADB 2004 
 
 
Table 2.3 MECHANICAL ENGINEERING Code 08 
 
Sub 
Code 
 
Grade 
OC 
 
Grade A 
 
Grade B 
 
Grade C 
 
Grade D 
 
Grade E 
 
01 to 14 
 
70,000 
 
200,000 
 
400,000 
 
900,000 
 
9,000,000 
 
Unlimited  
 
SUB-CODES 
01 air conditioning front discharge/split units 
02 central air conditioning systems 
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03 ducting and ventilation systems 
04 operation and maintenance of front discharge/split units 
05 operation and maintenance of central air-conditioning systems 
06 liquid petroleum gas installations and equipment 
07 low pressure hot water systems 
08 steam and boiler systems 
09 kitchen equipment installations 
10 refrigeration installations and cold rooms 
11 laundry equipment and services 
12 air compressors and compressed air services 
13 general fabrication and machine shop services   
14 Sewage pumps and moochers 
 
Grades 06, A & B are reserved for 100% citizen owned contractors only. 
 
Grades C & D are for 100% citizen owned joint-venture contractors, which means a 
foreign company, cannot tender a project in this category unless in joint venture with 
a citizen owned company. 
 
Grade E is open to all contractors with the capability to undertake projects of that 
magnitude. (PPADB 2004, Registration Form) 
 
2.13 Government Interventions 
 
In the early 1970s the Government established the Botswana Enterprises 
Development Unit (BEDU) under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, with the 
mandate to develop local entrepreneurs in all sectors of the economy including local 
contractor development.  The Government has provided several interventions 
designed to enhance citizen contractors with capabilities to successfully compete in 
the open market.  The government recruited BEDU technical advisory personnel from 
various international organisations such as SIDA, the UNDP, Peace Corps etc. to 
provide BEDU with the necessary skills in setting up small-scale industry 
programmes in various fields such as building/construction, textiles, woodwork, 
metalwork etc.  According to the annual progress report on the Botswana Enterprises 
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Development Programme (BEDP) that covered, the period between 1st May 1975 
and 30th April 1976, the development programmes impact was starting to be felt in 
different geographical parts of Botswana and in several industrial sectors. There was 
an increasing awareness, both within government and in the private sector (ter Haar, 
1976; page 2-7). 
 
BEDU’s initial intensive campaigns geared to launching the then new concept of local 
entrepreneurship was slowly being replaced by the promotion of specific industries by 
the entrepreneurs themselves.  It would appear that the development progress slowly 
died a natural death with the departure of international technical advisory personnel.  
Following that the government started introducing the Local Preference Scheme. 
 
• Local preference scheme 
 
This policy was first instituted in 1978. The purpose of the scheme was to direct a 
substantial share of the purchases of government, local authorities and parastatals 
towards local manufacturers as a means of promoting local production, and thus 
create job opportunities for citizens. The policy stipulated that goods of qualifying 
local manufacturers should be accorded a price advantage over foreign produced 
goods (CAB 32B) 
 
In June 1985, the Local Preference scheme was extended to include small (citizen) 
construction firms, who tendered for government and parastatal projects. During 
adjudication and evaluation, tenders submitted by citizen contractors were to be 
adjusted downwards by 2.5% of their tender price for purposes of evaluation up to a 
specified maximum value. 
 
• Case-by-case policy 
 
In November 1995, Government pronounced the case-by-case assistance policy with 
the objective of assisting citizen owned contractors to complete on-going 
Government and local government (council) contracts they signed on or before 
October 20, 1995.  The action was in response to an appeal for financial assistance 
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from Tshipidi Badiri Builders Association in October 1995.  This assistance policy 
was limited to citizen contractors registered with the Central Tender Board (CTB) now 
known as the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB), in the Ministry 
of Finance and Development Planning. 
 
The case-by-case basis assistance policy was to be implemented in accordance with 
the following guidelines. 
 
• Payment for Materials Directly to Suppliers and Payment for Wages for Work 
Done for that Particular Project. 
• Assistance for each particular project was limited: 
a) To direct payment to suppliers for materials required for work to be done; 
b) In exceptional cases, to direct payment of wages to employees and 
domestic sub-contractors for work to be done; 
c) As a last resort, to settlement of up to 3 months wage arrears incurred on 
or after July 1, 1995 for work already done on site by employees and 
domestic sub-contractors; and 
d) To the duration of the contract including any extensions of time that may 
be granted. 
 
In 1995 Government assisted citizen contractors with a total of ten million Pula to 
purchase materials and pay labour wages to complete the projects, which the 
contractors had failed to complete.  In this scheme a project administrator paid both 
material and labour directly. This policy saved many citizen owned contractors from 
liquidation and was terminated after the affected projects were completed. 
 
• Mobilization loan 
 
The Government assisted citizen contractors with the advance loan as capital 
required to get the project started.  The loan was fixed at 10% of the total 
construction sum, payable in three equal instalments with no interest; it was later 
revised to 15% payable in six equal instalments.  This scheme was abused, because 
the secured funds were used elsewhere by many contractors rather than on the 
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supposed mobilization.  The abuse of this scheme had raised some questions from 
the public such as: (2006/2007 Budget Speech) do the citizen contractors fully 
understand the fundamental principles of Government objectives on citizen contractor 
development?  Do they have the necessary skills to achieve Government objectives? 
Do some contractors view this as a golden opportunity to enrich themselves? 
 
• Advance Payments 
 
An advance payment of 10% of the total contract sum was paid to the contractor on 
provision of a surety for the advance by the contractor.  The surety was in a form of 
an undertaking from a bank or other financial institutions to guarantee the repayment 
of the advance within a specified period. This requirement could have been effective 
on identifying committed contractors. However, as revealed earlier, most citizen 
contractors could not raise the surety, and thus disqualified from the advance 
scheme. 
 
• 30% Reservation Policy for building construction projects. 
 
In 1997, through presidential directive, the Government issued a 30% reservation 
policy in which 30% of the total value of work undertaken in a particular year had to 
be reserved for 100% citizen owned contracting firms, for projects exceeding P1.8 
million. All projects below this value were automatically reserved for 100% citizen 
contractors. 
 
These policies are supposed to ensure that citizen contractors have works or projects 
at all times.  The questions still remain whether citizen contractors understand the 
Government’s main objectives of citizen contractor development aimed at assisting 
them to grow, to enable them to create employment opportunities and poverty 
alleviation for fellow citizens.  The answer to this question is very important because 
most citizen contractors prefer to remain at a lower grade where they make money 
because they lack technical and managerial skills for more complex projects. UNCHS 
(1996; page 18) observed that the recent works stress the importance of 
entrepreneurship for corporate success in today’s competitive global and national 
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markets. There is a common consensus that entrepreneurship is relevant to both 
small and large organisation. Other factors driving the need for entrepreneurship 
include: social and demographic changes, and psychological change. These factors 
would offer benefits and challenges. For example, how Botswana’s small (citizen) 
contractors are responding to opportunities offered by preferential and advance 
schemes. Capacity building and training mentorship are crucial to small contractor 
development.  
 
In broad terms, a contractor can be anyone who agrees to fulfill the terms of a legally 
binding agreement.  Most commonly, the term “contractor” is used to describe an 
expert in the construction industry who hires skilled and unskilled workers to 
construct or build a financed project.  An examining board should license a contractor 
before he or she can bid on the project.  This bid is based on the estimated cost of 
the building materials, the wages of subcontractors and labourers and the 
contractor’s fee for coordinating the project. A contractor should be able to offer his 
client more than just a low bid.  What is more important is that the project must be 
delivered on time, on budget, and to an acceptable standard (Pollic, 2007; page 1). 
 
2.14 Entrepreneurship 
 
UNCHS (1996; page 16) argue that the contractor needs to be an entrepreneur, able 
to innovate and to seek and exploit opportunities in many geographical and business 
areas and combine a variety of resources in an environment fraught with uncertainty. 
In developing countries, the contractor’s entrepreneurship should be of an even 
higher quality as the operating environment poses severe problems that can hinder 
running, and further growth and development of the company. 
   
According to Wallener (2006; page 1) an entrepreneur is an individual who accepts 
financial risks and undertakes new financial ventures.  The word derives from the 
French “entre” (to enter) and “prendre” (to take), and in a general sense applies to 
any person starting a new project or trying a new opportunity. Characteristics of an 
entrepreneur include spontaneous creativity, the ability and willingness to make 
decisions in the absence of solid data, and a generally risk-taking personally.  An 
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entrepreneur may be driven by a need to create something new or build something 
tangible. 
 
Entrepreneurs are generally highly independent, which can cause problems when 
their ventures succeed.  In a small company the entrepreneur is able to personally 
manage most aspects of the business, but this is not possible once the company has 
grown beyond a certain size.  Management conflicts often arise when the 
entrepreneur does not recognise that running a large stable company is different from 
running a small growing company (UNCHS, 1996; page 16-18). 
 
Ofori (1996; page) defines an entrepreneur as someone who identifies a market of 
opportunity for products and creates organisation to pursue the opportunity. 
Successful entrepreneurs are able to identify potential business opportunities better 
than most people. They focus on opportunities not problems; they seek outside help 
to supplement their skills, knowledge and ability. 
 
According to the above definitions of an entrepreneur, a contractor is (or can be) an 
entrepreneur and it suggests that any small contractor development programme that 
does not include capacity building or training in technical, managerial and 
entrepreneurship is bound to failure. 
 
2.15    Fronting in Construction Industry   
 
Fronting is often a very difficult term to define as people have many different 
perceptions about it.  It is also difficult to distinguish or to draw a line between what 
fronting is and what corruption is as most people see them as the same thing.  The 
Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 6th Edition defines fronting as “hiding 
something illegal – a person or an organisation that is used to hide an illegal or 
secret activity for something”.  While this definition holds in some countries where 
fronting is illegal, it may not be useful in Botswana. 
 
This is so because while people strongly believe fronting should be treated as an 
illegal activity, the law in Botswana does not cater for that and the result is that it now 
turns out to be an immorality issue.  It is against this background that a working 
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definition had to be delineated as; “any act by any person or organisation which is 
intended to or has been used to misrepresent information in order for that person or 
organisation to benefit directly or indirectly from any reservation or preferential 
scheme that is not intended for such a person or organization” (Thupeng and 
Letsapa, 2005; page 3).  
 
For example fronting infiltrated South Africa’s policy of Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE); the government had to clamp down on companies that claimed 
false black economic empowerment credentials to win contracts from the Department 
of Public Works. On 3 August 2005 the Minister of Public Works, Stella Sigcau, was 
recorded to have said that 15 companies with no BEE status had illegally claimed to 
be headed by black people. Government instituted a two-year investigation into the 
matter and discovered that the companies had defrauded the department of more 
than R 414 million. The Minister said the 15 companies would be blacklisted from the 
National Treasury and the Construction Industry Development Board. This clearly 
demonstrates government’s commitment to black economic empowerment (Ntuli, 
2005; page 1).    
 
• Current reservation processes are easy to flout; the Directorate on Corruption 
and Economic Crime (DCEC) has noted that with every new reservation 
scheme that is being introduced to protect citizens from competition with 
foreigners for the provision of services within a given sector of the economy, 
there is an increase in the number of foreign owned companies turning citizen 
owned in that sector either by their directors acquiring citizenship or by the 
transfer of shares to citizens in an unprecedented manner, where share transfer 
may have been made to the indigenous citizen while the control of the company 
remains with the foreigner.  It has also been noted that where the companies 
turn citizen by the transfer of shares, the kind of consideration paid is 
unjustifiable or there may be no proof of consideration paid at all ( Thupeng and 
Letsapa, 2004 page 9). This is seen as defeating the whole purpose of 
reservation schemes because the same people the government is trying to 
protect citizen contractors in the industry from benefiting from preferential 
schemes end up getting round the system and re-entering the race.  It must be 
noted that most of the time the foreigners who turn citizens may either already 
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have benefited in some ways from their countries, resulting in them being more 
financially powerful and technically advanced for an ordinary (indigenous) 
citizen to compete with. 
 
DCEC has also observed that the directors who acquire citizenship generally have 
dependents (spouses and children) that still hold their country of origin’s citizenships 
and only change their status once there is some unscrupulous share transfer that 
they may have found necessary to effect for them to continue benefiting from the 
citizen empowerment schemes; or to benefit from an emerging new scheme.  This 
also shows that the benefits of the company in the reservation scheme will be 
enjoyed mostly by the non-citizen dependents that may opt to go back to their 
countries of origin once they have accumulated wealth (Letsapa, 2005; page 14).  
The fundamental question is who does government intend to empower and what 
action has been taken against those who defrauded the system?   
 
• Management of reserved schemes by non-citizens; DCEC has observed that 
non-citizens who may not have the interest of the country and its citizens at 
heart normally carry out the identification and management of projects or items 
of work that should be reserved.  It is also important to note that the current 
process of identifying work to be reserved does not comprehensively allow 
citizens or organizations representing them to have a say regarding work or part 
of work that may be reserved. This usually leads to disputes where 
organizations representing citizens may feel that work, which could otherwise 
have been reserved for citizens, had been misplaced at a stage where work 
may already be under execution.  This is particularly common with housing 
projects where multiple units of the same size and shape are built because the 
criterion, which is usually used to determine if the project can be reserved or not 
is usually the total cost of the project.  In such cases citizens usually argue that 
if the project could be sub-divided into different sections with smaller units in 
each section, then it could be simpler and hence would qualify to fall under their 
category (reserved).  Other people however, argue that this may lead to delays 
in the completion of such projects and may cause some technical problems 
given the likelihood that the builders’ performance may vary, leading to late 
completion of projects. 
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• Lack of capacity to monitor and implement reservation schemes; it has been 
realized that even though the provision of some services and the licensing 
thereof have been reserved for citizens, foreigners still take part in the provision 
of such services, works or supplies.  This is caused by several factors such as 
lack of knowledge by the employees of procuring entities of the existence of 
reservation policies governing the procurement of such services, works or 
supplies; or by the non-existence of guidelines or criteria to use when 
determining if the provision of a given service, work or supply may be reserved 
or not; or a deliberate effort by corrupt employees who do not reserve work that 
qualifies for reservation; and so on. 
 
Currently the implementation and monitoring of these schemes is done by procuring 
entities, the PPADB and management consultants.  Procuring entities have several 
setbacks in their implementation of the reservation processes in that they lack 
knowledge of the reservation policies and do not have guidelines to follow when 
reserving work as earlier stated.  The PPADB on the other hand may have the 
knowledge of the policies, but their main setback is in that even though they are in 
the process of developing some guidelines and criteria that will make the reservation 
process implementation easier, they currently do not have enough manpower to 
oversee the smooth running of the new process once it is in place. 
 
Management consultants in conjunction with controlling bodies made up of 
representatives from respective procuring entities and other stakeholders have been 
overseeing the registration of building contractors and ICT companies for eligibility to 
be classified as 100% citizen owned companies in order for them to benefit from 
works, services or supply contracts reserved for citizens.  The PPADB has of late 
decided not to renew their contracts and has already taken over the responsibility of 
screening and registering ICT companies for eligibility to be classified as 100% 
citizen owned. In addition, DCEC has revealed that of all the entities (PPADB, 
Procuring Departments and Management Consultants) that have been tasked with 
the duty of overseeing the implementation and monitoring of the citizen 
empowerment schemes, none has the capacity to appropriately carry out the 
mandate. 
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• Conflict of interest and political interference; the procurement processes used 
by the local authorities give politicians (councillors) too much power and makes 
it easy for them to influence the award of tenders to people of their choice.  
These politicians have the final say in the award process and as such they may 
disapprove or may refuse to endorse the recommendations made by officials on 
who to award the work to without advancing any valid reasons.  This has lead to 
the awarding of tenders to people who could not perform, or to those who had 
previously failed to perform their contractual obligations when they were doing 
work for the same authorities. 
 
The failure also results from awarding work to people whose hands are already full 
but still win more work because they have backing from the politicians.  It is also 
common to find these politicians and high-ranking officials owning companies that 
always do work for the authorities where they are decision makers.  Even though 
these officials and councillors may excuse themselves from taking part in the tender 
adjudication proceedings, the perception that their colleagues will reciprocate the 
favour in future cannot be dismissed (Letsapa, 2005; page 14). 
 
This brings up questions such as: do citizens understand the Government objectives 
on citizen contractor development?  Did Government or stakeholders educate the 
public, especially contractors about Government objectives to be achieved by policies 
or schemes on citizen contractor development in Botswana in order for them to 
understand Government intentions on economy diversification, employment creation 
and poverty alleviation?  Do they understand that contractor development is a long-
term process, which requires a long-term commitment from all parties involved? 
 
For many years the Government and public have been concerned with the manner in 
which public construction projects have been delivered.  Most projects have been 
delivered beyond budget and have often been of poor quality.  The Minister of 
Finance and Development Planning in his 2006/2007-budget speech recently raised 
this concern. Some citizen contractors blame their failure to compete on fronting.  As 
stated earlier, some unscrupulous citizens front for firms or individuals, particularly 
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Chinese who are said to be to subsidised by their Government, and often tender very 
low which in turn paralyses citizen’s contractors as they attempt to beat their prices. 
 
It must be emphasised that the Government can not fight fronting and corruption 
alone, it would require effective participation of all stakeholders, interested 
community groups, and long term political and financial support to remove corruption 
practices and tendencies in systems. 
 
According to a study undertaken by the Directorate on Corruption and Economic 
Crime (DCEC), at the Department of Architecture and Building Services (DABS) 
presently known as the Department of Buildings and Engineering Services (DBES), 
up to a total of fifty-eight alleged corruption cases were reported between September 
1994 and August 2002.  Nineteen of these allegations were related to the award of 
contracts, while the other thirty-nine involved fraud, bribes, false qualification and 
misadministration.  Undoubtedly, Botswana has a fast growing economy in the region 
and the Government invests a large part of its financial resources on construction 
project, and therefore it is imperative for the country to empower its citizens with both 
technical and entrepreneurship skills to enhance the capabilities to meaningfully and 
effectively participate in the construction industry and thus subdue corrupt tendencies 
(Letsapa, 2005; 13-15). 
 
2.16 Localisation within the Public Sector 
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, since independence it has been the Government’s aim to 
empower its citizens.  The first president of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, on more 
than one occasion spoke of localisation and training as a vehicle which could lead to 
genuine sustained development.  According to the report of the Presidential 
Commission on Localisation and Training in the Botswana civil service, and the 
Government Statement on the Report of the commission of 1973, the then President 
told Parliament in December 1972 “we must ensure that public service is equipped to 
shoulder its responsibilities” (Presidential Commission, 1973; page 1-2).   He 
described the first report of the Localisation and Training Commission as a major 
step in the right direction. 
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A Presidential Commission on Localisation and Training in the Botswana Civil 
Services was established as a permanent body to continue reviewing the progress 
made in the implementation of its recommendations that have been approved by 
Government with respect to localisation and training. It was to remain in operation 
until such a time when civil service had been substantially localised.  The commission 
was to continue to report at regular intervals and in light of the prevailing 
circumstances, the commission was to modify its recommendations in order either to 
accelerate or defer recommended rates of localisation and training (Presidential 
Commission, 19973, page 1-2). 
 
The Government initiative on localisation and training was and is in line with ILO 
concepts on utilisation of local human resources.  According to the ILO, public 
service has played a key role in the social and economic development of any country 
and has been considered as a guarantor of a citizen’s right to dignified participation 
within their society. The Public Service is understood here to cover not only public 
administration, but also various services being provided in the public or general 
interest, whether they are delivered publicly or privately.  Traditionally, such services 
have mainly been delivered publicly, but the private sector has increased its share in 
managing and delivering certain services against the backdrop of increased 
deregulation and reform of the public sector across the world (ILO, 2004b; page 2). 
 
Immediately after attainment of democracy in 1994, the new South African 
government realised that exclusion of indigenous African, Indian and Coloured 
people, collectively known as black people from meaningful participation in the 
country’s economy was not sustainable. The Department of Trade and Industry noted 
that the country required an economy that could meet the needs of all its economic 
citizens, its people and their enterprises in a sustainable manner. This would be 
possible only if the economy built the full potential of all persons and communities 
across the country.  No economy can grow by excluding any part of its people, and 
an economy that is not growing cannot integrate all of its citizens (Alexander, 2005; 
page 1). 
 
In his State of The Nation Address of 2006 with the theme, “Boost skills, boost 
growth”.  President Thabo Mbeki announced a number of measures to develop the 
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skills of South Africans, particularly in maths and science, as part of the government’s 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (Asgisa). He said “To meet 
our objectives, we will have to pay particular attention to the issue of scarce skills that 
will negatively affect the capacity of both the public and the private sectors”.  
Regarding jobs for graduates, the President said “the government has established a 
database to help link tertiary education graduates with employers” (Alexander, 2006; 
page 2). 
 
In 2005 The Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo Ngcuka made a call for skilled 
South Africans in the country and abroad to offer their skills to improve service 
delivery, following an assessment of the capacity of the departments of Health, 
Housing, Education and Trade and Industry (Alexander, 2006; page 2). By 
comparison, after independence in 1966 (a period of over 40 years), what has the 
government of Botswana done to ensure that every citizen is empowered to have 
meaningful participation in the country’s economy? 
 
Table 2.4 reflects the staffing position in the Ministry of Works and Communications 
in the then Building Branch (now known as Department of Building and Engineering 
Services) (DBES) in 1973. It is clear that during those years expatriates held all 
senior and key decision making positions.  When comparing table 2.4 which indicates 
1973 public servants technical staff with table 2.7 which reflects the current employed 
personnel at DBES, there is a clear indication that little has been achieved in terms of 
localisation in the construction sector and key decision making posts are still held by 
expatriates. Even though the Government localised Directorate posts, what impact 
have they had on institutional and organisational implementation of projects? But do 
these expatriate have local counterparts to understudy them, to enable transfer of 
skills localisation?  Answers to these questions are discussed in chapter 5. 
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TABLE 2. 4 List of Public Servant Professionals in 1973 
  
POST 
 
GRADE 
NO. OF 
POSTS 
 
LOCAL 
 
EXPAT. 
 
VACANT 
Chief Architect S.IV 1 - 1 - 
Senior Architect S.V 1 - (P&P) 1 
Senior Quantity Surveyor S.V 1 - - - 
Architect A/AP 2 - 1 - 
Quantity Surveyor A/AP 1 - 2 - 
Sewerage Engineer A/AP 1 - 1 - 
Chief Inspector Works T.1 1 - 1 - 
Engineer Asst. Sewerage T.2 1 - 1 - 
Senior Inspect. Works T.2 4 1 3 - 
Inspector of works T.3 5 1 4 - 
Architectural Asst. T.3 1 1 - - 
Quantity Surveyor Asst. T.3 1 - 1 - 
Senior Foreman T.3 5 5 - - 
Junior Foreman T.5 4 4 - - 
Trainee Draughtsman T.7 3 2 - 1 
Sources: Presidential Commission 1973 
 
The question that needs to be answered is what happened to the Permanent 
Presidential commission that was responsible for localisation and training with the 
mandate to modify its recommendations in order either to accelerate or defer 
recommended rates of localisation and training?  Although it is not clear how many 
citizens have been trained in construction related fields, the current statistics 
obtained on March 1, 2006 from Central Statistics, Ministry of Finance & 
Development Planning indicate the following as per Table 2.6. Even though the 
accuracy of these statistics is questionable, in cognisance of what the literature 
review revealed about construction industry in Botswana, specially, what DCEC 
revealed as problems affecting implementation of projects by government institutions. 
DCEC indicated that was insufficient localisation in high position post at DBES, lack 
of capacity for monitoring performance on project implementation, and lack of project 
management skills (Thupeng and Letsapa 2005; page 14). It is evident that there is 
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an urgent need for local human resource development and utilisation in order to 
overcome increasing unemployment and poverty rate.   
 
 
 Table 2.5 the current statistics of Citizen Professionals in Construction 
Industry Related Fields 
 
 Profession Total No 
Architects, Town and Traffic Planners 315 
Civil Engineers 165 
Electrical Engineers 541 
Electronics and Telecommunications Engineers 115 
Mechanical Engineers 226 
Cartographers and Surveyors 340 
Architects, Engineers and Related Professionals 82 
 
Source: Central Statistics 2006 
 
For the past 42 years of independence, Botswana has been unable to localise key 
positions of public servants at DBES and other related departments in accordance 
with The Presidential Commission on Localisation and Training established in the 
early 1970. 
 
For example, according to table 2.7, there are nine positions for Chief Project 
Coordinators, a position responsible for project implementation.  Expatriates hold 
75% of filled posts.   
 
The Government should undertake radical reforms in the construction industry in 
accordance with ILO or other international organisation standards. The proposed 
reforms should focus on local human resource development and utilisation within the 
public sector, to start institutional and organisational development that could be 
replicated in the private sector through programmes such as Citizen Contractor 
52 
Development. The ultimate results will be employment creation and poverty 
alleviation, because building construction is by its nature labour-intensive.  
 
On 10 January 2007, the Midweek Sun newspaper ran an article entitled “Fiasco at 
DBES” (Department of Buildings and Engineering services) written by a frustrated 
citizen consultant architect. The author highlighted lack of institutional, organisational 
and local human resource capacity resulting in the government spending over P200 
million as additional costs. He indicated that due to under capacity, the DBES often 
outsource services for design and supervision of implementation of their building 
construction projects (post-contract services).  He expressed his concern regarding 
the tendency by both DBES and the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board 
(PPADB) of ignoring the consultants’ tender report and accepting the lowest tender 
irrespective of the margin of error below the Project estimates. He cited Kentz 
Botswana as an example. Kentz Botswana, a subsidiary of Kentz South Africa, was 
liquidated in December 2005 while engaged in four major district hospital projects in 
Maun, Mahalapye, Molepolole and Lobatse.  These projects were valued at over 
P250 million each, and the value of work awarded to Kentz Botswana was in excess 
of P100 million. All these projects were tendered for prior to the Botswana currency 
Pula devaluation of 7.5% in 2004 and 12.5% in 2005. Thereafter, Kentz Botswana 
submitted a compensation claim for devaluation of P24 million which was rejected by 
the DBES, and that led Kentz Botswana to file for liquidation. It took more than eight 
months for the client (DBES) to appoint a contractor to replace Kentz on the four 
sites, in fact government had approved in excess of P200 million for the appointed 
contractor or contractors to complete the projects. It is evident that this amount will 
escalate due to claims from consultants for standing time. The above is an evident of 
lack of institutional, organisational development that is based on local human 
resource. For an example some expatriates who have been involved with these 
projects at conceptual stage in 1998 on contracts of 2years, might have left the 
country when the projects encountered problems.   
 
It will be appropriate for the government to review the whole DBES structure in order 
to establish appropriate institutional and organisational development based on local 
human resources. He categorically stated that the problems are partly caused by 
government reliance on expatriates; “part of the reason is because of the contingent 
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of East Africans who have been recruited into DBES and are working the system to 
their and their fellow countrymen’s advantage. Directorate of Corruption and 
Economic Crime (DCEC) seem totally unable to contain these people too” (Morris, 
2007; page 7).   
 
These are serious allegations that require prompt and swift action by government. At 
present, Botswana is experiencing an escalating unemployment rate among youths.  
Botswana as a Member State of the African Union (AU), subscribes to the initiatives 
on employment creation and poverty alleviation, and the Plan of Action with eleven 
priority areas with objectives, strategies and recommended action which was adopted 
as guidelines for Member States to develop national action plans (Paratian, 2005; 
page 3). The priority areas of the Plan of Action included the following: 
 
1. Good leadership to promote employment and alleviate poverty 
2. Good governance 
3. Promotion of local development and empowerment 
4. Resource mobilisation 
5. Participatory approaches to poverty reduction strategies 
 
The Plan of Action was adopted in September 2004. What has the government of 
Botswana done so far regarding the implementation, especially in terms of promotion 
of local development and empowerment and promotion of employment?  
 
2.17 Emoluments and Terminal Benefits 
 
There are perceptions within government administration that suggest that citizen 
employee’s demand or expect salaries unaffordable to government. Are those claims 
true? Table 2.3 below seeks to make a comparison between citizens and expatriates 
as public servants. This table clearly indicates that conditions of employment favour 
expatriates more than citizens. If there are adequately trained citizen professionals 
within the country, why is the government not able to effectively utilise them by 
providing incentives similar to those of expatriates, rather than offering better benefits 
to expatriates and overlooking its own people?  
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The obvious reason why there is an exodus of citizen professionals, especially at the 
Department of Buildings and Engineering Services is the disparity between 
expatriates and citizens in terms of remuneration and benefits irrespective of 
qualifications.  For instance, an expatriate gets salary plus expatriate allowance, 
furnished accommodation and 30% of cumulative salary at the end of each contract 
period.  The citizen gets salary only, has to find accommodation for him/herself and 
has to wait until 50 years of age to benefit from early retirement pension funds. With 
this prevailing work environment, how can government expect to have effective and 
efficient organisational structure, which is based on local human resources?   
 
Table 2.6 Public Servants Employment Benefits – Expatriate versus Citizen 
Benefits Expatriate Citizen 
Salary Salary + expatriate 
allowance + car allowance 
Salary + car Allowance 
only 
Accommodation furnished accommodation nil 
Gratuity 25-30 percent of salary at 
the end of each contract 
period (2-3 years) 
At retirement, early 
retirement age 50 years 
Leave Concession  3 months leave and free 
round trip air ticket for 
entire family to home 
country at the end of each 
contract 
P 700.00 maximum every 
two years 
   
Source: General Orders 1996 
 
Salary 
 
It is apparent that expatriates are paid more than citizens because they get a salary 
plus an expatriate allowance. 
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Gratuity 
 
According to General Orders Governing the Conditions of Service of The Public 
Service of The Republic of Botswana, Contracting Officers are entitled to receive a 
gratuity at the end of each contract of 24 months or more at the rates and conditions 
laid down  in their contracts.  
Contract gratuities are normally paid at the following rates:   
 
• First contract  25% of aggregate salary 
• Second contract  27.5% of aggregate of salary 
• Third and subsequent Contract 30% of aggregate salary 
 
‘’Aggregate salary” in this instance means the gross salary earned by an Officer 
during his/her contract of duty, including car allowance (General Orders 1996). 
 
Passages (Journeys) and Baggage Allowance 
An expatriate contract officer is entitled to the following passage: 
 
• On first appointment, a single journey for him/ herself, spouse and dependent 
children under nineteen years of age from the departure in the country where 
recruitment took place to Botswana 
• Where an expatriate has been appointed for a further contract, return journey 
ticket for him/herself and family as indicated on Table 2.3 (General Orders 
1996). 
 
With the exclusion of compassionate leave costs, it is quite clear that the government 
spends more financial resources on expatriates than on citizen public servants. Why 
does the government not invest the expenditure in developing local human resources 
in order to build long term organisational capacity which would result in sustainable 
socio-economic benefits? 
  
Some people argue that the world has become a global village of open market 
employment and therefore governments are not obliged to focus only on their 
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citizens. The argument contradicts ILO’s objective on helping developing nations with 
employment creation and poverty alleviation as discussed in chapter 2, by assisting 
developing countries with development programmes to develop local human and 
material resources which would result in a sustainable socio-economy. For example, 
during global sport competitions participating countries prepare their citizens very 
well in order to compete. It is never left to individuals to fend for themselves, but 
rather becomes a national project or goal. Similarly, it should be government’s 
responsibility to ensure that citizens are well trained and prepared to face the global 
challenges starting with their own country. 
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TABLE 2.7 DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING AND ENGINEERING SERVICES (DBES) 
PERMANENT AND PENSIONABLE SENIOR STAFF LIST 
SCALE No. of No. POST 
GRADE 
DIVISION 
POST 
LOCAL EXPATRIATE 
 
VACANT 
1 Director E1 Directorate  1 1 0 0 
2 Deputy Director E2 Maintenance/Technical/Project Implementation  3 3  0 
0 
3 Assistant Director D1 Architectural  1   1 0 
4 Technical Training Coordinator D1 Directorate  1 1  0 0 
5 Mechanical Maintenance Coordinator D1 Maintenance  1 1  0 
0 
6 Building Maintenance Coordinator D1 Maintenance  1 1  0 
0 
7 Electrical Maintenance Coordinator D1 Maintenance  1 1  0 
0 
8 Chief Project Coordinator D1 Project Implementation  9 2 7 0 
9 Project Coordinator D2 Architectural/Quantity Surveying/Project Implementation  3 0 1 
2 
10 Project Manager D2 Project Implementation  3 2  0 1 
11 Ministerial Technical Manager D2 Project Implementation  6 4 2 0 
12 Principal Architectural I D2 Architectural 1 0 1 0 
13 Principal Quantity Surveyor I D2 Project Implementation/Quantity Surveying 2 0 2 0 
14 Training Coordinator D3 Training Coordinator  1 1  0 0 
15 Principal Electrical Engineer I D2 Electrical Design  1 1  0 0 
16 Principal Engineer II D3 Engineering  3  0 2 1 
17 Principal Architect II D3 Architectural  4 1 3 0 
18 Principal Quantity Surveyor II D3 Quantity Surveying  4 1 3 0 
19 Principal Structural Engineer II D3 Engineering  1  0 0 1 
20 Superintendent Works D3 Regional  5 4 1 0 
21 Mechanical Engineer I C1 Mechanical Design & Maintenance  6 6  0 0 
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 TABLE 2.7 DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING AND ENGINEERING SERVICES (DBES) 
PERMANENT AND PENSIONABLE SENIOR STAFF LIST 
22 Senior Mechanical Engineer D4 Mechanical Design & Maintenance 9 1 8 0 
23 Senior Quantity Surveyor 1 D4 Quantity Surveying 5 4 0 1 
24 Chief Technical Officer D4 Architectural, Mechanical Design & Maintenance 28 19 6 
3 
25 Senior Electrical Engineer D4 Electrical Design & Maintenance  5 0 3 2 
26 Senior Technical Officer C2 Mechanical Design & Maintenance  7 6 0 1 
27 Principal Architect D3 Architectural       
28 Senior Architect D4 Architectural  10  1 5 4 
29 Senior Structural Engineer D4 Engineering  5 2 3 0 
30 Senior Building Services Engineer D4 Engineering  1 1 0 0 
31 Structural Engineer I C1 Engineering  2 1 1 0 
32 Mechanical Engineer I C1 Mechanical Design & Maintenance      
33 Architect I C1 Architectural  3 2  1 0 
34 Quantity Surveyor I C1 Quantity Surveying  3 2  1 0 
35 Electrical Engineer I C1 Electrical Design & Maintenance  6 2 3 1 
36 Engineer I C1 Engineering  3 2 0 1 
37 Principal Technical Officer C1 Architectural, Quantity Surveying, Maintenance & Regional Office  54 37 12 
5 
38 Architect II C2 Architectural  6 2 21 3 
39 Mechanical Engineer II C2 Mechanical Design & Maintenance  5 5  0 0 
40 Electrical Engineer II C2 Electrical Design & Maintenance  3 2    
41 Quantity Surveyor II C2 Quantity Surveying  2 2 0 0 
42 Engineer II C2 Engineering  2 1  0 1 
43 Assistant Electrical Engineer C2 Electrical Design & Maintenance  3 1  0 0 
44 Assistant Quantity Surveyor C2 Quantity Surveying  1 1 0 0 
45 Assistant Mechanical Engineer C2 Mechanical Design & Maintenance       
 
TOTALS 221 124 87 27 
Source: DBES 2005 
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Summary 
 
Literature review has revealed that construction industry is very important to every 
country’s socio-economic development. International organisations as ILO, World 
Bank and other donor agency for decades have been assist developing countries to 
establish their local construction industries by focusing on the development of 
indigenous contractors; local materials; local human resource. 
 
Many writers have indicated that various construction industry development 
programmes have been tried in different developing countries. It would appear as if 
labour-intensive programmes have more successful rates than the overall 
construction industry development programmes. For an example, small- contractor 
development agency failed in Kenya (NCC). The programme was replicated in 
Botswana (BEDU) and Swaziland both failed, the reason being that it did not 
consolidate entire industry. In Lesotho it failed and turned into Labour-intensive 
programme. Botswana’s labour-intensive programme has been reported as one the 
most successful programme. 
 
The literature has revealed that for the construction development programme to 
successfully mobilise local human resource and local materials, the programme 
should be spearheaded by the government to avoid fragmentation of the industry in 
different ministries and departments as it is the case in Botswana.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW PART TWO: INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL 
CAPACITY BUILDING 
 
2.18     Introduction 
 
Literature review has revealed that human resource development, institutional 
development and organisational development are three aspects that are 
fundamental to the success of a small contractor development programme. The 
author decided to review literature on these aspects to enhance the study. 
 
2.19 The Importance of Institutional, Organisation and Human Resource 
Development 
 
Although Botswana seem to be committed on empowering its citizen contractors 
with preferential schemes, the aspects of development of local human resource and 
local materials are not linked to the initiatives. 
  
 Wakely (2006, page.2) defines the aspects as follows; a) Human resource 
development is the process of equipping people with understanding and skills, and 
the access to information and knowledge to perform effectively. It includes 
motivating people to operate constructively and efficiently through the development 
of positive attitudes and progressive approaches to responsibility and productivity. b) 
Organisational development is the process by which things get done collectively 
within an organisation, be it a central government ministry, a local authority 
department, a private sector enterprise, a non-governmental organisation or 
community group. c) Institutional development encompasses the legal and 
regulatory changes that have to be made in order to enable organisations, 
institutions and agencies all levels and in all sectors to enhance their capacities. 
 
International Labour Office has helped developing countries to set up successful 
local contractor development programmes. These programmes include institutional 
capacity and ability of the client organisations to cope with their role as contract 
managers. 
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The State is the largest single employer across the world. Thus, public sector 
reforms have had an enormous impact on the labour market in all countries that 
have implemented reforms. The public service personnel comprise persons 
employed by public authorities at central/federal, regional/provincial/state and 
local/municipal levels and include both public servants (to whom specific regulation 
applies) and public employees (ILO 2004b; page 2). 
 
On September 2004, the African Union (AU) Heads of State and Government 
convened a first of its kind Extra-ordinary Summit on Employment and Poverty 
Alleviation in Africa, in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in collaboration with the 
Regional Economic communities (RECs), the ILO and other partners and 
stakeholders. The summit committed itself to address structural constraints to 
investment and entrepreneurship to promote social dialogue and partnership among 
government’s social partners, civil society and the sector, at the enterprise, sectoral, 
national, regional and continental levels. A Plan of Action with eleven priority areas 
with objectives, strategies and recommended actions was adopted as a guideline for 
member States to follow (Paratian 2005, page2): 
 
1. Good leadership to promote employment and alleviate poverty; 
2. Promotion of agricultural and rural development; 
3. Good governance; 
4. Promotion of social protection for all and respect of core labour standards; 
5. Empowerment of women; 
6. Promotion of local development and empowerment; 
7. Enhancement of integration and cooperation at regional and continental levels; 
8. Vulnerable groups; 
9. Resource mobilization; 
10. Enhancing ownership; 
11.  Participatory approaches to poverty reduction strategies. 
 
It is apparent that any of the above Plan of Action areas can only have sustainable 
achievement when there are adequate institutional, organisational and local human 
resource capacities or successful development programmes. 
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2.20 Human Resource Development  
Many writers have clearly indicated that a prerequisite for successful small 
contractor development programme, contractors should be helped to develop 
technical and managerial skills (Dlungwana and Rwelamila 2004a; page 2, ILO, 
2004; page 1, UN, 2000; page 1). 
 
In 2004 ILO at its Ninety-Second Session Conference adopted recommendation 
concerning human resources development: education, training and lifelong learning. 
Recommendation 3 says “Members should identify human resources development, 
education, training and lifelong learning policies which; 
  
Based on the conviction that the workforce is the most valuable resource of the 
public service, the Joint Meeting on Human Resource Development (HRD) in the 
public service in the context of structural adjustment and transition held in 1998 
recalled the ILO Human Resource Development Convention, 1975 (No.142), and 
the resolution and conclusions concerning adjustment and human resources 
development adopted by the International Labour Conference, at its 79th Session in 
1992. The resolution endorsed the significance of comprehensive human resource 
development policies in times of structural adjustment and transition, emphasizing 
that education and training constituted an essential element in a virtuous circle 
consisting of training and skill development, higher work motivation, higher 
productivity, continuous adjustment of enterprises and workers to change, higher 
employment and increased incomes and well-being. It further stressed that human 
resource policies should be formulated and implemented within the framework of 
adherence to democratic principles, tripartism and consultation between the 
Government, the social partners and community groups. The Meeting concluded 
that human resource development in the public service is an important part of the 
reform process. It should take place in a coordinated framework and not be 
fragmented. HRD will only succeed if it recognizes that not one solution will meet all 
circumstances. Public service workers have to be provided with appropriate skills 
and orientation in order to ensure quality service delivery. HRD takes place as a 
process in which the workers should be included and consulted and they should 
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receive fair treatment based on international labour standards (ILO, 2004a, page 2-
3).  
 
 In addition to the responsibility of providing high quality and efficient services to 
their citizens, public authorities or governments should create decent work 
conditions for service providers. However, there is evidence that working conditions 
and terms of employment have not always met these standards. For example, newly 
employed workers often face worse conditions, such as lack of a defined job 
description, mentorship and career path development. Workers in public services 
should be guaranteed fundamental principles and rights at work, in particular 
freedom of association and collective bargaining (ILO, 2004a;  page 4-5). 
  
According to Wilson (2003; page v) the key principles underpinning any institutional 
and organisational development programme include the following: 
 
• Focus on outcome: What are we trying to do or to achieve and why? 
• Timeframe: How long should it take to achieve the desired goals/objectives? 
• Context: Where do we start? The precise entry point will need to take into 
account the overlapping nature of institutions at different levels. 
• Participation: Whom do we work with? All stakeholders must fully 
understand the objectives of the programme. The process should be inclusive 
and enabling to ensure long-term sustainability. 
• Accountability: When will we know we have accomplished the task? 
Accountability depends heavily on a control system and a regular flow of 
information.  
 
Some key elements which effectively contribute to employment creation and poverty 
alleviation within the Human resource Institutional and Organisational Development 
programme in developing countries according to the Department for International 
Development and the International labour Organisation are (Wilson, 2003; 9-11,13-
21,23-30): 
 
• Institutional capacity building 
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• Organisation 
• Training 
• Mentorship 
• Monitoring & Evaluation 
• Controlling system 
 
According to the ILO, the critical challenge that faces human society at the start of 
the twenty-first century is to attain full employment and sustained economic growth 
in the global economy and social inclusively. This challenge has recently become 
even more complex and demanding. Economic, social and technological change is 
gathering pace and calls for continuous policy and institutional adaptation in order to 
meet new needs and seize the opportunities that are opening up in a rapidly 
integrating world economy. It has been increasingly recognised that people's 
endowment of skills and capabilities, and investment in education and training, 
constitute the key to economic and social development. Skills and training increase 
productivity and incomes, and facilitate everybody's participation in economic and 
social life (ILO, 2004a; page 3, 4).   
 
Human Resource Development (HRD) has the goal to improve the capability of 
people to adapt to the world of work in a comprehensive manner, and thus should 
be promoted with the emphasis on employability. Today, information technology is a 
great tool for business development, especially in the manufacturing sector that is a 
priority area for most of the countries in the region. In this sense, training to catch up 
with the evolving information technology should be given an appropriate place within 
the whole scheme of HRD. Human resources development is thus an important 
responsibility for employers. However, significant areas of it are primarily the 
responsibility of governments, and should remain so, especially with regard to the 
necessary infrastructure. There is also a role for others. Dialogue between employer 
organisations and educational institutions are essential to ensure curricula are 
relevant to emerging market needs. Partnerships between government, employers' 
organisations and workers' unions have proved to be crucial in promoting and 
implementing human resources development strategies. Equally important is the 
role of individual workers. It is important to demarcate the respective roles of each 
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stakeholder. Employers have a particular role in changing organisational culture, 
promoting individual responsibility and attitudes (UN, 2000; page 2). 
 
Wakely (2006; page 2) says “Good human resource management provides 
incentives and rewards; opportunities for continuous training and re-training; clearly 
recognisable career opportunities; and competitive pay scales. To achieve these 
aspects of HRD, the organisational environment must be dynamic and responsive”. 
In Botswana, government departments are faced with an exodus of professionals 
leaving their positions for the private sector, or even abandoning their careers due to 
lack of a defined career path and development process within government 
structures. These shortcomings defeat the entire Government policy on Citizen 
Empowerment. If the government is failing to empower its citizens in positions of 
responsibility and decision-making, it is not conceivable that any development 
programme without citizens as the main stakeholders will ever bear fruitful results.  
 
It is very important for the government to recognize the following: 
 
• It is the primary responsibility of government for the training of all its citizens 
(including the unemployed, those seeking to enter or re-enter the labour 
market and people with special needs), to develop and enhance their 
employability to secure decent work, in private and public sectors through 
such measures as incentives and assistance; 
• The role of the social partners to support, through human resources 
development policies and other measures; 
• The role of local authorities and communities and other interested parties in 
programmes of citizen development and economic empowerment.  
 
The ILO’s framework of descent work addresses both the quality and quantity of 
employment and provides the basis for new human resource. Development and 
training policies are a continuous process that can be incorporated into long–term 
small contractor development. 
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2.21   The Importance of Institutions on Successful Small Contractor              
Development 
 
The new Webster’s Dictionary and Thesaurus of the English Language defines an 
institution as “an organisation whose purpose is to further public welfare, learning 
etc, the building or group of buildings used by such an establishment, the act of 
instituting something, or an established law or custom”.  Which means that 
institution may need to change before organisation can be improved.  Institutions 
govern individuals and collective behaviour. The above definition clearly indicates 
that a development programme requires a well-established Institution with full 
capacity to guide organisations, the private sector and stakeholders on what needs 
to be done, when and how. They may be a formal-legal system, property rights, an 
enforcement mechanism or informal traditions.  They may operate at different levels: 
international, National (e.g. Laws, constitutions), Social (e.g. norms of conduct, 
status of women), and family (e.g. inheritance rules).  They may nest within larger 
institutions e.g. village-based collective institutions nested within the policy 
institutions of government.  They are often also referred to as “the rules of the 
game”.  The rules of the game shape the incentives that drive behaviour and 
performance, and expectation about rights and obligations.  They have a major 
influence on economic development and the success and sustainability (or lack of it) 
of specific projects and programmes (Wilson 2003; page 4-10). Institutions are often 
created by rich and powerful who are most likely to discriminate against or ignore 
the interest of the poor. For instance, Botswana is one of the African Union member 
countries that adopted the Plan of Action on employment creation and poverty 
alleviation as discussed above. The question, which should be answered, is “what 
has government done in terms of institutional capacity building in the area of the 
construction industry in order to meet the continental objectives?” 
 
According Wakely Institutional development should encompass the legal and 
regulatory changes that have to be made in order to enable organisations, 
institutions and agencies at all levels and in all sectors to enhance their capacities. It 
should embraces such issues as regulations and policies pertaining to controlling 
the implementation of development projects and organisational development 
capacity of Government agencies and municipal authorities; the ability of local 
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government to negotiate contracts and form partnerships with private enterprises 
and community organisations; centrally regulated conditions of employment, salaries 
and career structure (Wakely, 2004;page 1-5). Such institutional issues generally 
need the political and legislative authority of national government to bring about 
effective change (Wilson, 2003; page 15). These changes can bring about a positive 
drive within government departments, which would result in motivated organisations, 
and thus yield the expected results of employment creation and poverty alleviation. 
 
2.22 The Values of Organisations on Development Programmes 
 
Organisations are structures, which operate under rules.  Organisations are thus 
groups of players who come together for a common purpose or to achieve specific 
objectives.  They adopt their tactics and organisation according to externally defined 
rules and regulations – the rules of the game. 
 
Organisations encompass political bodies, such as political parties or parliaments, 
economic bodies, such as firms or businesses and social bodies, such as churches 
and schools.  They usually have discrete boundaries, a budget and a structure. 
Organisational development is the process by which things get done collectively 
within an organisation, be it a Government department, a private sector enterprise, 
or a non-governmental organisation (NGO). It stipulates management practices and 
procedures; rules and regulations; hierarchies and job descriptions: how to get 
things done. It is also concerned with working relationships; shared goals and 
values; teamwork, dependencies and supports: why things get done (Wilson, 2003; 
page 15-21) that can be a motivating factor to all participants. 
 
It is critical to develop adequate institutional and organisational capacity to enable 
developing countries to face the challenges of an increasingly integrated world 
economy due to globalisation. Professor Patrick Wakely, who co-authored a 
background paper for Habitat II on capacity building, argues that this term embodies 
much more than simply training and human resource development (Wakely, 2004; 
page 1-5).  
Wilson (2003, page iii) argues that poor performance is often due to institutional 
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failings ignored by narrowly focused technical interventions. Institutional factors 
have been a key cause of poor development performance. This is borne out by 
recent World Bank evaluations and highlighted in the 2002 World Development 
Report, which stresses the importance of institution building for growth and poverty 
reduction. DFID’s Governance Target Strategy Paper4 identified the key capabilities 
which governments need if they are to work better for poor people to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Achieving the capabilities is very much a 
matter of institutional change. 
 
2.23 Interventions 
Development interventions are more likely to succeed if they promote improvements 
in wider institutional competencies as well as in technical competencies. Capacity 
building at whatever level needs to take account of both the institutional and 
organisational context - it should always be driven by a clear focus on the desired 
outcome - “what are we trying to achieve?” – In this case employment creation and 
poverty alleviation. Therefore interventions may require institutional and 
organisational development that focuses and builds on local realities with long-term 
commitment. The institutional environment keeps on changing with time; both 
problems and policies formulated to address them should be reviewed and changed 
over time.  This presents a challenge to the traditional concept of the project cycle 
with its essentially linear approach of identification, design appraisal, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation. With institutional development, 
interventions are often long-term, requiring a willingness to maintain involvement 
over a decade or more. It thus lends itself to a process approach where, within 
agreed overall objectives for institutional change, outputs and the activities and 
inputs required to achieve them are defined more clearly as development proceeds. 
Table 2.5 below gives a comprehensive review with its thought provoking questions 
on key principles underling underlying institutional and organisational development. 
The approach should be considered to be the starting point of a successful 
development project or programme.  
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Table 2.8 Key principles underlying institutional and Organisational 
development  
Outcome focus 
“What are we 
trying to do and 
why?” 
Transformation must be driven by a focus on desired outcomes. 
In many cases this will be improved service delivery, and/or more 
equitable access to services. 
 
Timeframe 
“How long 
Should it take?”  
 
Changing the rules of the game - familiar, communal, social, or 
collective takes time. Unrealistic change processes and 
timeframes will fail. Getting real participation is vital and time-
consuming. 
Context 
“Where do we 
start?” 
 
Institutional development must start from and be constantly 
informed by current social, political and cultural realities. This 
involves understanding different groups’ incentives, whether for 
change or for retaining the status quo. Changing incentives of 
powerful groups may be the most effective mechanism of 
institutional change. The precise entry point will need to take into 
account the overlapping nature of institutions at different levels 
(local, national and international). 
Participation 
“Whom do we 
work with?”  
 
Changing the rules of the game will meet with opposition from 
vested interests and from those who do not understand the 
rationale. Widespread stakeholder participation should develop a 
shared understanding of what needs to be changed and why, 
how to bring change about, and acceptance of new “rules”, which 
need to be widely disseminated and well understood. The 
process should be inclusive and enabling to ensure long-term 
sustainability. 
Accountability 
“When will we 
know we have  
accomplished 
the task?” 
There is a need to ensure that the reform process is meeting its 
objectives.  Is institutional change facilitating achievement of 
desired outcomes? Are poor people getting the intended 
benefits? Accountability will be heavily dependent on a regular 
flow of information  
 
 
Source: DFID 2003 
This requires particular attention to monitoring, to provide a framework for adapting 
interventions to take account of progress and of changing conditions.  Technical 
interventions that leave unsatisfactory institutions intact will probably achieve 
nothing (Wilson, 2003; page 13). For example, Botswana has formulated various 
interventions for many years as a bid to improve the construction industry, but what 
impact did those interventions had on institutional and organisational process?     
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Institutional changes need genuine commitment from key stakeholders, especially 
those at senior levels and those who are influential. It is usually not worth 
proceeding if this commitment is not there. It should be noted that commitment is 
linked to understanding and, therefore it is crucial to ensure that all stakeholders 
clearly understand key principles underlying a development programme.  
 
2.24   The Process and Structured Guidelines 
  
 
A 5-step process, detailed structured guidelines, and suggestions about appropriate 
tools for institutional and organisational development are adopted (Wilson, 2003; 
page 3-5).  
Step1. The overall institutional framework must include:  
 
• "What are we trying to achieve and why?"  
• "What are the main institutional strengths/weaknesses?"  
• Highlights the importance of having clear developmental outcomes and a clear 
understanding of the institutional framework, including the roles of 
stakeholders. 
•  Introduces you to the main diagnostic tools and techniques used in 
institutional appraisal - how to probe for the key underlying causes of 
institutional weakness before deciding which priorities need to be addressed. 
 
Step 2 Organisations in the wider institutional framework include: 
• "What are the main organisational strengths/weaknesses?" 
•  “What is the overall institutional and organisational diagnosis?” 
•  Looks at the diagnosis of organisational problems, in the context of the wider 
institutional environment.  
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Step 3 designing an intervention includes: 
• "What is the best way to promote change?"  
• Describes a number of possible interventions with some guidance on selection.  
 
Step 4 Implementation includes: 
• “How do we implement the change programme?” 
• Highlights the importance of managing interventions as a change process and 
the important factors that lead to success or failure. It also touches on how to 
revive stalled interventions.  
 
Step 5 Monitoring and evaluation includes: 
• "How do we know we are achieving our goals?" 
•  Sets out a process for monitoring the success of institutional interventions, 
and for an exit strategy. 
 
Table 2.6 summarises the key institutional components that enable governments to 
priorities among their desired outcomes in order to allocate scarce resources to best 
advantage. Determining and sticking to priorities need effective decision-making 
structures and policies. Institution policies can be changed to make them more 
supportive to the targeted objectives. 
Table 2.9: Institutional Components  
 
Priorities Has government identified its priorities amongst its desired outcomes 
and allocated resources accordingly? Are allocations adhered to? 
What are the core policy and decision making structures? What levels 
of expenditure can be afforded in the short, medium and long term? 
What mechanisms are available to ensure that poor people’s views 
are taken into account? Who sets priorities and in response to what 
interests? Can priorities be translated into resource allocations?  
Policies  How effective are the core policy and decision-making structures and 
processes? Are they based on evidence and data? What is the 
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availability and quality of data? What is the impact of policy changes 
on the poor? 
Incentives What is the current formal/informal incentive structure? Who benefits? 
What are the incentives for state structures to deliver services; for the 
bureaucracy to attract and motivate staff; for the development of 
national skilled human resources? What incentives, if any, are there to 
modify behaviours of key players in support of the desired outcomes? 
What incentives are there to review and improve performance? 
Rules and 
Law 
Are formal rules and laws respected? Are there informal rules leading 
to corruption, patronage, victimisation, and exclusion? Can rights be 
enforced through law? Are rules and law subject to political 
interference? Are there informal systems of dispute resolution?  
Culture National attitudes to risk, hierarchy, incentive systems, participation, 
donor interventions, etc. Willingness to engage in consultation. 
Responsiveness to information. Issues of community and individual 
identity. 
Drivers 
 for change 
What are the key drivers for change? Social, technological, economic 
or political? Are there sponsors or champions for reform? Extent of 
their power and influence. Level of commitment to reform. What 
benefits or incentives do they have to push a reform process? Level of 
political stability. What are the implications of the current electoral 
cycle? 
Voice and 
 partnership 
  
What mechanisms and structures are in place to promote the 
concerns of poor people? Awareness raising, capacity building, joint 
management of e.g. forestry or water resources.  
Participatory budgeting? How effective are they? What voice do poor 
people have to hold delivery organisations to account? Report cards, 
public audits? 
Source: DFID 2003 
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2.25  The Function of Organisation within the Wider Institutional Framework 
 
Organisation, according to the New Webster’s dictionary, is an organised 
association or society of people working together to achieve a common goal. 
Therefore, organisation development is a process by which procedures are 
established on how things should be done collectively within an organisation. As 
discussed previously, an organisation cannot function or operate effectively without 
well-established institutional capacity to guide its operations.    
 
When bringing changes to an existing organisation it is essential to undertake a 
thorough organisational diagnosis exercise in order to identify the cause of problems 
or failures, not just symptoms. Organisational problems or failures may be caused 
by lack of institutional capacity, for example, lack of political will to enforce 
adherence to existing rules and regulations, or wider institutional reforms may be 
necessary to address a particular problem. This means addressing symptoms it will 
not bring sustainable improvement and may exacerbate (Wilson, 2003; page 7).  
 
Table 2.7 sets out the main organisational components and shows how they are 
linked to various institutional issues.  For example, the Botswana Government may 
be committed to its citizen empowerment programme initiatives, but do organisations 
or departments responsible for implementing government policies have the 
organisational capacity to do so?  This table enables those who may be involved in 
development programmes to appreciate important roles played by both 
organisational and institutional capacity. It has been observed that after 40 years of 
independence, government has been unable to develop institutional and 
organisational capacity based on local human resources. There are reports of skilled 
human resources leaving the public service. Consideration of the People and 
Human Resource Management component will allow answers for organisational 
issues that would address employee turnover. 
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Table 2.10: Organisational components and institutional links 
 
Component Organisational Issues Relevant Institutions 
Inputs and 
Resources 
Financial position and prospects. 
Expenditure - where does the 
money go? What links are there 
with clearly and publicly defined 
outputs and outcomes? Do staff 
costs crowd out other 
expenditure?  
 
Government priorities and 
policies. Government resource 
allocation. 
Public expenditure. 
Management Accountability for 
use of public funds. 
Strategy Is there a strategic plan? Is it 
appropriate? Is it effective? Is 
there a change management 
strategy? 
 
Government priorities and 
policies 
Government resource allocation 
Culture Management style and 
bureaucratic behaviour. Likely 
impact of external change 
agents. How much consultation 
and participation?  
 
Dominant national values and 
norms Drivers for change  
 
People and 
Human 
Resource 
Management 
Basic statistics.  Are staff well 
managed and well motivated? Are 
appointments and promotions 
made on merit?  Are pay scales 
adequate? Skill gaps? Training? 
Government priorities and 
policies Government resource 
allocation Dominant national 
cultural  
values and norms. 
Incentives  
 
Systems and 
Processes   
(including 
decision 
making and 
management 
information) 
What are they? Are they used? 
What are the problems? E.g. Is 
there enough / too much / too 
little management. 
 information? How is it used? 
What about accountability? And 
coordination? Do procurement 
procedures give value for money, 
are they transparent and honest? 
 
Government priorities and 
policies Public expenditure 
management Accountability for 
use of public funds  
Dominant national values and 
norms  
 
 
Structure What is formal structure? How 
does it work in practice? Is it 
appropriate? Does it support lines 
of accountability, decision-making 
and co-ordination? Control of 
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resources and levels of 
accountability. How far are 
matters decentralised?  
 
Outputs and  
Performance 
Baseline Impact in the real world 
- outcomes Performance 
indicators Performance 
management Feedback  
Voice and Accountability 
Mechanism 
Source: DFID 2003 
 
2.26    Developing a Clear Structure for Collating the Overall View. 
After organisational components and institutional links have been reviewed, the 
overall recommendation needs to: 
• Set the institutions and the organisation in context and summarise the key 
features. 
• Provide a framework that captures all the potential dimensions of institutional 
and organizational problems. 
• Facilitate discussion and engagement with stakeholders. 
 
Table 2.7 sets out a possible framework to help develop a perspective of the key 
issues.  It can also be used as a checklist and to help evaluate diagnoses completed 
by third parties.  Even though it is difficult to disaggregate the institutional issues 
from the organizational, it is advisable to review all issues.  The exercise will 
diagnose government departments or organisational structuring problems that need 
to be addressed in order to improve organisational delivery systems and thus realise 
the government’s main objective of employment creation and poverty alleviation. 
Corruption has recently crept into Botswana’s construction industry and has 
adversely affected the current project procuring process to an extent that many 
projects which were supposed to have been implemented in the 2006/2007 fiscal 
year have been delayed or halted due to Court injunctions or proceedings on 
corruption allegations. So what is the root cause of the said corruption? It is 
assumed that reviewing Structuring the Diagnosis Table 3.4 could enable those 
involved in a developing programme to identify causes for failures of particular 
organisations or institutions. 
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Table 2.11: Structuring the Diagnosis  
 
The Overall Environment  Inputs and Resources  
 
• Economic background - growth etc. 
• Political/legal environment - stability, legal framework 
of institution, corruption, extent of political 
interference in detailed operations 
Social - cohesiveness of society, minorities issues 
• Priorities and policy making capacity 
• Revenue: major sources; how stable are 
they?  Is there a serious shortfall and if so 
why? 
• financial and capital assets  
• Numbers of staff by job category 
• Major programmes  
• Balance between personnel and operating 
costs 
Key drivers for change 
History of previous reform efforts and achievements 
Key stakeholders – what critical actions have to be taken? 
Outcomes – what constitutes programme success? 
Incentives – to modify behaviour of key stakeholders 
Accountability and governance arrangements 
Information influences 
• Budgeting system – how effective? 
• Does final expenditure bear any relation to 
the budget? 
• Is there a link between expenditure and 
outputs? 
• Size of budget surplus/deficit 
• What accountability and audit 
mechanisms are in place? 
• For commercial enterprises, is the 
organisation financially sustainable? 
• financial performance over last 3 years 
Strategy  
• Official statements of goal and mission   
• Actual priorities as indicated by budget allocations 
to divisions 
• Is there a strategic planning process – in what form?   
Were staff and other stakeholders involved?   
• Form of high level decision-making   
• Has the strategy been derived from an appraisal of the   
Opportunities, threats? Current levels of service delivery?   
• Are the goals and strategy generally understood    
• Is there a plan to achieve the changes necessary to  
adapt and review in light of circumstances? 
Culture  
•attributes of national culture and their 
impact on the institutional  framework / 
management of the organisation  
•What are the implications of the above? 
•Consultative/ participatory   
Performance management  
• Monitoring information  
• Impact of external change agent  
Likelihood of a more effective organisation 
meeting its goals  
People/HRM  
• Human "outputs" - indications of satisfaction and  
commitment such as absenteeism and turnover   
• Pay scales and how they compare  
• Is there a performance management/appraisal system?  
• Perceptions of leadership of organisation  
• Investment in training/skills development  
• Skills shortages  
• What are the main personnel systems? Does the  
Organisation know how many staff it has?  
• What is the recruitment system? Are there any major  
staff shortages?  
• Informal power blocks and coalitions  
 
• Major systems for high level decision-
making, strategy formulation and planning  
• Are systems clearly documented?  
• What evidence is there of use of systems? 
• What management information is supplied 
at what levels?  What action is taken as a 
result? 
• Are there clear lines of accountability?  
• Try a random check on how a specific 
system is being used in practice  
• What formal and informal mechanisms 
exist for co-ordination?  
•Are there documented procurement 
processes?  
 
Structure  Outputs/Performance  
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• What is current structure? Is there a clear  
Organisation chart?  
• Are there clear lines of accountability and responsibility?  
• What are the number of management levels in the   
organisation?   
• What are the average spans of control?   
• Basis for grouping of units  
• Co-ordination mechanisms  
• Spatial distribution of units  
• Degree of decentralisation of processes and authority  
 
 • Main products or services  
• Indications of satisfaction with services  
• Impact on the poorest in society  
• Baseline of performance - what outputs,  
at what cost and outcomes  
 • Performance of key policies  
 • Is there a performance management 
system? 
Source: DFID 2003 
 
2.27 Examples of Institutional and Organisational Development  
 
UNCHS (1996; page 56) the weaknesses in the administrative framework and 
procedures of developing countries have an adverse impact on the operations of the 
contractor. This is most severe where the client is a public-sector one. It is ironic 
that even where the government is taking measures to improve upon the 
performance of small contractors, public clients are seldom-good clients. The 
efficiency of the administrative framework is a key factor in the work construction 
enterprises within each nation. In Malaysia the government structured its agencies 
that are involved in various aspects of construction, and with which the contractor 
usually deals for each public project or whose activities affect the contractor’s 
operations and prospects. 
 
Table 2.12 Administrative structure for construction in Malaysia  
 
Ministries or government departments in Malaysia involved in control, approval, monitoring 
or participation in construction are: 
 
1. Prime Minister’s office – approval of projects; implementation and coordination; registration of 
contractors 
 
2. Ministry of Finance –contracts and supplies 
 
3. Ministry of Housing and Local Government – housing activities; local government on planning 
and building approval and control. 
 
4. Ministry of Work – all aspects of construction 
 
5. Ministry of trade and industry – approval of manufacturing establishments; import of materials 
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6. Ministry of Energy, Telecommunications and Posts – licensing of electricians; telephone and 
telecommunication services 
 
7. Ministry of Education – establishment and of education institutions at all levels ( for training and 
education of construction personnel) 
 
8. Ministry of Human Resources – training personnel for the construction industry 
 
9. Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment – standard; R & D; environment 
 
10. Ministry of Land and Regional Development – planning and approval of land use Ministry of 
Public Enterprises – corporations and agencies participating in construction. 
 
11. Other ministries and departments 
 
Source: Wang 1991 
  
The above approach is what this report is advocating for, a comprehensive review of 
Botswana’s construction industry that would clearly reflect government’s vision 
concerning the small (citizen) contractor development in terms of its overall policy on 
citizen empowerment, and address the following: 
 
• Government departments responsible for implementation clearly understand 
and share that vision, and do they have the organisational capacity?  
• Are all stakeholders having an active participation?  
• Do existing institutions and organisations have adequate capacity to 
implement the development projects or programme? 
 
This example underpins and demonstrates the fact that well researched and 
strategise interventions, comprising institutional and organisational reform that 
encompasses the interest of all stakeholders results in policies, rules and 
regulations tailored or targeted to address the diagnosed prevailing structural 
problems and in most cases bear expected results.   
 
2.28  Designing an Intervention or Types of Intervention  
 
When considering what sort of intervention is required, start with the institutional 
issues and then move between the institutional and the organisational issues. 
Institutional reform usually focuses on policy, or on incentives to improve service 
 79 
delivery. Organisational reform may be structural, systemic or human resources. A 
reform programme may embrace some or all of these elements. Institutional reforms 
can be slow and expensive and often call for the reform of organisations to 
implement the new measures (Wilson, 2003; page 21).  
 
It is best to start by looking at the institutional options. This involves a fundamental 
review of the "rules of the game" and of core purpose, including whether the function 
is necessary or not, and then looking at a range of alternatives.   
Lessons from successful reform programmes provide useful insights into the likely 
conditions under which change may occur - table 2.10. 
 
Table 2.13: Conditions that support institutional change 
 
The following factors have been observed to be important for creating policy and 
institutional change: 
• Crisis. Countries that face serious crises of legitimacy, stability or sustainability 
may be forced to adopt drastic measures to protect themselves: the cost of NOT 
changing policies and institutions may be greater than the cost of change. Windows 
of opportunity for change can present themselves at such times, as for example in 
the financial crisis that hit South East Asia in the 1990s. 
• Leadership consistently plays an important role in reform situations. It is generally 
leaders who put reform on national political agendas, who provide a vision, who are 
actively involved in shaping the content of proposals for change and who spearhead 
the process of generating support and managing opposition to change. The 
emergence of strong champions of change provides an opportunity for promoting 
policy reforms. 
• Ideas - particularly ideas about the appropriate design of institutions - are important 
in defining new rules of the game. Most commonly, ideas are understood as political 
resources, a form of capital that is issued to promote particular positions or to 
influence the outcome of decisions. Drawing on foreign influences, ideas can have a 
considerable impact on the types of solutions offered to deal with institutional 
deficiencies. The content of institutional change may often be defined through 
exposure to new ideas from elsewhere or by piloting new concepts in a country. 
International standards or norms may often provide an entry point 
• The social organisation of the poor (the “demand side”) is very important in a 
reform process. It can raise the significance of poverty issues for political elites. The 
beneficiaries of altered rules of the game need to be supported to protect new 
institutional arrangements.  
 
Source: DFID 2003 
The conditions that support institutional change has been successfully implemented 
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by the Malaysian government, where more than 11 ministries are involved in 
small contractor development programme. It is an indication that the 
leadership put reforms on national agenda to ensure that small contractor 
development is realised. 
2.29 Institutional Interventions – Policy Reform not Suitable for Poverty 
Alleviation. 
Policy reform is traditionally slow and governed by political and other vested 
interests that may have little interest in pro-poor policy change (Wilson, 2003; page 
15 -21). 
Policy reform is usually:  
 
a. Incremental: small improvements to existing policy. 
b. Influenced by previous practice: new policy typically reflects established 
norms, standards and perceptions about the ways things happen.  
c. Shaped by a wide range of stakeholders: policy and institutions define the 
opportunities for organisations and for wider society. Organisations of all 
sizes desiring favourable outcomes for themselves or their constituents 
will seek to influence them. New policies and institutions are typically the 
product of protracted negotiation between competing interest groups.  
d. Political: ministers will want to set policy in ways that will satisfy their own 
personal and political agendas.  
 
None of the above is good news for the poor. The causes of poverty can be 
traced to policy and institutional frameworks that discriminate against poor 
people. Incremental changes - (a) above - may not be an option when seeking to 
restore fundamental distortions. Radical policy and institutional reforms may be 
required which also run counter to the traditional processes at (b) (c) and (d) in 
that:  
 
• They introduce totally new - and often alien - concepts or paradigms to the 
policy arena that challenge strongly held views about the 'ways things 
should be done'.  
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• Pro-poor change alienates those who will lose benefits they enjoyed under 
the old regime. This group of 'losers', many of who are likely to be well-
organised and influential, will strongly resist.  
• Policy makers will not welcome challenges to their political authority and 
patronage systems.  
 
Interventions to reform policy are particularly difficult. Opportunities may 
however arise as a result of reviews or changes in the legislative framework.  
Public pronouncements by politicians may provide an opportunity to review 
existing policy or clear weaknesses in the application of existing policies that may 
be picked up by the media. All of these provide openings through which policy 
reform can be actively discussed (Wilson, 2003; page13-21).  
 
Institutional Interventions - Improved Service Delivery  
Wilson (2003; page 15) says that a key outcome of institutional and organisational 
reform is improved service delivery to the poor. To improve delivery, governments 
are experimenting with a range of institutional mechanisms, including  
• greater use of markets and contracting out. 
• Setting up performance-based agencies in the broader public sector and 
holding them accountable for the achievement of outputs or outcomes. 
• Voice and accountability mechanisms such as user participation and client 
surveys to ensure that there is a clear articulation of both demand for services 
and engagement in maintaining the quality of delivery. 
• Public sector reform programmes, notably public expenditure management 
reform to sharpen up priorities and improve budgeting and accountability 
processes. 
 
The enabling agency model  
The “hub” model (Figure 2.3) focuses on the relationships between enabling 
agencies (which are institutions - but not the only ones), organisations and users 
and suggests some institutional questions. It highlights the principal/agent 
relationship and identifies the need for institutional changes to support and sustain 
 82 
new patterns of service delivery by organisations.  
Figure 2.3: The “hub” Model; Government and Institutional Structures 
 
 
 
Source: Hobkey and Shields 2003 
 
 
Table 2.14: Questions suggested by the “hub” model  
 
Enabling agency - Delivery agency  
• Does the enabling agency set appropriate standards for service delivery?  
• Does the delivery agency meet those standards?  
• If not, what happens?  
 
Delivery agency - User  
• Do users have a representative organisation?  
• How do users monitor service standards?  
• What is the relationship between users and deliverers? If users 
lack adequate muscle why is this?  What can be done?  
 
User - Enabling Agency  
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• Is the relationship adequately developed to give a greater voice to users, 
especially poor people?  
• If a stronger direct link is needed should this be through:  
i representational committees to channel information both ways ( Electricity 
Consumers’ Committees in the UK)  
ii governing bodies to act as brokers of information but with an added authority 
function (UK school governors)  
iii quasi-market relationships such as money or vouchers from the enabling 
agency to enable users to choose which delivery agency to use  
 
Source: DFID 2003 
2.30 Enabling Environment 
Construction has a major role to play in the economic development of all countries 
and needs to be seen as a viable instrument or avenue for employment creation and 
poverty alleviation. There is no doubt that Botswana as a developing country with a 
sound economy has a lot of infrastructure projects, which are to be undertaken in a 
sustainable long-term period. 
In his 2007/ 2008 budget speech, the Botswana’s Minister of Finance and 
Development Planning expressed government concern regarding the lack of 
implementation of development projects despite the availability of funds from 
government departments such as the Department of Buildings and Engineering 
Services (DBES). It has been observed that funds allocated for development 
projects are returned at the end of each fiscal year due to lack of implementation of 
projects. The Minister stated that the government would ensure that measures are 
put in place in order to implement all development projects in accordance with the 
overall Government plan 
It is evident that there are lots of outstanding development projects, which can be 
utilised for employment creation, with long-term sustainable socio-economic benefit, 
and thus poverty alleviation. 
Botswana has the potential to strategize development projects for employment 
creation by establishing a Construction Industry Development Board that will be 
responsible for the following: 
• Sustainable economic growth and productivity of the sector 
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• Rapid and efficient delivery of quality assets to the public 
• Sustainable employment creation 
• The active promotion of small and micro-enterprises (SMEs) 
• A human resource development strategy which is holistic, sustainable and 
accessible 
• The development of public-sector capacity to manage the delivery process. 
• Government’s role in promoting an enabling environment for development. 
In 1999 South Africa produced the “White Paper” on creating an enabling 
environment. It outlines how impediments to industry growth and development, and 
broad economic and social challenges can be overcome (GOVZA, 1999; page 9). 
On the basis of lessons learned in other developing countries, how does Botswana 
intend to solve its unemployment problems without seriously engaging development 
projects as viable means to achieve that objective?  It is imperative that government 
should review its policies and regulations so that they provide an enabling 
environment for citizens to fully participate and control the construction industry both 
in the public and private sector. It is a fact that communities need development and 
service delivery, but development projects with no socio-economic benefits are not 
desirable in a developing economy. 
 
 
Summary 
 
Small (citizen) contractors play the vital role in the construction industry of 
developing countries by boosting employment-creation and other economic 
opportunities, which results in provision of socio-economic benefits to the entire 
country, and thus alleviate poverty.  
 
It is important therefore to have a clearly focussed development programme that 
includes the provision of assistance to contractors in developing their skills, 
knowledge and competencies in such a manner that will enable them to operate 
their enterprises on a sustainable basis. The process of development requires 
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assessment in order to achieve continuous improvement in each contractor’s 
performance.  Additional benefits can also be realised, such as increased spending 
in the country’s economy by local contractors, a growing entrepreneurship base of 
the country’s citizens and improved delivery of infrastructure.  
 
The development of a local contracting industry in developing countries, which is 
able to mobilise and effectively utilise local human and material resources, is seen 
as important to develop and maintain infrastructure. Small (citizen) Contractor 
development programmes should include the capacity and ability of the client 
organisation to cope with their new and changed role as contract managers. It 
should also include creation of an enabling environment and removal of barriers to 
their entry into the market by nurturing their growth and sustainability. 
 
All successful national or large-scale programmes have been linked to long-term 
training programmes. Some key elements that effectively contribute towards 
employment-creation and poverty alleviation are within human resources, 
institutional and organisational development. 
  
Human Resource Development (HRD) has the purpose to improve the capability of 
people to adapt to the work in a comprehensive manner, and thus should be 
promoted with the emphasis on employability.  Human resource development is thus 
important for the employer.  However, significant areas of it are primarily the 
responsibility of government and should remain so, especially with regard to the 
infrastructure development. 
 
Dialogue between employer organisations and educational institution is essential to 
ensure curricula are relevant to emerging market needs. An institution is an 
organisation whose purpose is to further public welfare, which means that 
institutions may need to change before organisations can improve rules and 
regulations that govern individuals and collective behaviours. Rules and regulations 
shape incentives that drive behaviour and performance, and expectation about 
rights and obligations. They have a major influence on economic development and 
the success sustainability (or lack of it) of specific projects and programmes. 
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Organisations are structures, which operate under rules and regulations, therefore 
organisations are groups of players who come together for a common purpose or to 
achieve specific objectives. They adopt their tactics and organisation according to 
externally defined rules and regulations.  
 
 An adequate institutional organisation which is able to cope with the challenges of 
an increasingly integrated world economy is a dimension of development to which 
policy makers and development agencies are turning their attention.  
Poor performance is often due to institutional failings ignored by narrowly focused 
technical interventions. Institutional factors have been a key cause of poor 
development performance. Development interventions are more likely to succeed if 
they promote improvements in wider institutional competencies as well as in 
technical competencies.  
Capacity building at whatever level needs to take account of both the institutional 
and organisational context - it should always be driven by a clear focus on the 
desired outcome -what are we trying to achieve?   
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CHAPTER 3: Research Methodology 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
The author has adopted the qualitative research method to analyse available data 
as an attempt to understand why Botswana citizen contractors fail despite 
government continued support schemes, and how construction development 
programme can be appropriately established and implemented. 
 
The critical part was to determine the rate of success and failure among citizen 
contractors. Failure in this instance was defined as the inability to complete the 
project within the specified to time, budget and quality to the satisfaction of the 
client. 
 
There was no literature or policy documentation on Government schemes on 
interventions for the citizen contractor development plan or programme because 
policies came about as Presidential or Cabinet directives. 
 
3.2  Qualitative Research Method 
 
Qualitative research was found more suitable for this research because it rely on 
reasons behind various aspects of behaviour. It investigates the why and how of 
decision-making, as compared to the what, where and when of the quantitative 
research method. Hence, the need is for smaller but more focused samples rather 
than the large random samples, which quantitative research provides. 
 
Qualitative modes of data analysis provide ways of discerning, examining, 
comparing and contrasting, and interpreting meaningful patterns, relative to 
particular goals and objectives of the project or programme on hand. 
 
The contexts of existing policies were evaluated to measure their alignment to the 
broader sense of small and medium contractor development programmes as 
implemented in other developing countries. The modalities of the implementation of 
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various assistance schemes by government for citizen contractors have been 
reviewed in order to measure achievements made. 
 
3.3 Methods of Data Collection 
 
A request was submitted to the Deputy permanent secretary, Ministry of Works and 
Transportation for the study to access recorded data of project implementation that 
includes; priced Bill of Quantities, progress reports, payment certificates, and 
projected cash-flow from relevant departments and stakeholders. 
 
The underlying factor was to determine the main objectives of why the small (citizen) 
contractor programme was established and how those objectives were going to be 
achieved. 
 
Interviews with senior Government officials involved in the implementation of the 
policy were held, which revealed the fact that the objectives and goals of citizen 
contractor development are not well defined in a manner that all implementing 
officers fully understand what is to be achieved, how, and when. 
 
It is noteworthy to record that this study is limited to the Ministry of Works and 
Transportation, Development of Building and Engineering services, and focuses 
mainly on the building construction industry. 
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CHAPTER 4: Evaluation of Strategies and Data Analysis on Small (Citizen) 
Contractors Performance on Project Implementation in Botswana  
 
4.1 Introduction  
Botswana as one of the fastest developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an 
escalating rate of unemployment, has the potential to utilise the construction 
industry as a viable means for employment-creation and poverty alleviation. 
Construction, especially building construction, is by its nature labour intensive.  
Therefore, in Botswana where there is high government expenditure on 
infrastructure development projects, some of these projects could be integrated into 
a small (contractor) development programme as a component of the Citizen 
Empowerment Policy in Botswana. 
 
At present the government is losing a lot of funds on non-effective schemes or 
interventions that are designed to empower citizen contractors to compete 
economically. According to the Botswana Enterprises Development Unit (BEDU), in 
its annual report on its enterprises development programme of June 1976, it says 
that during those years the programme continued to progress satisfactorily, and its 
impact was felt in different geographical parts of the country (ter Haar, 1976; page 
7). 
 
The BEDU localisation programme experienced a serious setback when locally 
trained Advisory personnel resigned, and later international advisory personnel also 
departed. Today there are a number of small (citizen) contractors who acquired 
some basic technical skills from the BEDU enterprises development programme 
who are still active in the industry, but lack managerial and contract skills. 
 
The study has discovered that at present there are no longer developments or 
advisory programmes in existence, which are formulated to provide long-term 
enterprises development assistance to small (citizen) contractors. Rather there are 
various interventions that do not adhere to international standards of development 
programmes, and therefore have failed the expected results of long-term 
employment-creation, and poverty alleviation. The government continues to lose 
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large sums of money in the process of citizen contractor development due to lack of 
appropriate development programmes as discussed in chapter 2. Government loses 
funds on abandoned projects mostly due to citizen contractors. This study has 
learned that there is no qualification requirement at the OC level for someone to 
register as a contractor. Some unscrupulous citizens have seen this as a window of 
opportunity for self-enrichment.  Some contractors because of lack of managerial 
skills have mismanaged the advance mobilisation loan funds and thereafter 
abandon the project.   
 
The present intervention schemes lack very important aspects of development 
programmes such as; structured and defined objectives, continuous contractor 
assessment, monitoring and evaluation, training, mentoring, control, etc. The result 
of this deficiency is clearly depicted in Table 4.1 which shows abandoned projects 
between January 2000 and September 2005.  According to data obtained from 
Ministry of Works and Transportation, 30 No projects under DBES as the procuring 
entity alone were abandoned. These projects required the government to source 
more than P 70 million additional funding to allow completion by others.   
 
4.2 Escalation on Project Costs 
 
In addition to extraordinary expenditure on abandoned projects, government 
continues losing money on cost and time overruns. In view of lessons learned from 
the literature review in chapters 2 and 3, it is now possible for the reader to derive 
conclusions regarding causes of failure in Botswana’s construction development 
initiatives.   
 
Data from Appendix B, tables 4.2.1 to 4.2.17 has been extracted from a preliminary 
report for the study on the “Cause of Poor Performance of Public Construction 
Projection in Botswana” by Ssegawa, Ngowi and Motsielenyane, for the BOCCIM 
Construction Sector, who were provided the same information by DBES (Ssegawa 
et al, 2005; page 40-69).  In view of the aforementioned information, it is clear that if 
the government continues losing financial resources in the construction industry at 
this rate, the supposed government primary objectives that include service delivery, 
employment-creation, citizen empowerment and poverty alleviation as enshrined 
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national vision 2016 will not be realised. Therefore, government must take decisive 
action to correct the prevailing situation sooner rather than later. 
 
4.3 Data Analysis for Cost and Time Performance on Previous Projects 
 
Cost performance is obtained by the following Equations 
 
Cost savings / (escalation) = original cost –final account or paid-to-date 
 
Change in cost = original cost – final account or paid to date 
                                             Original cost  
 
Paid-to-date is used in case the final account is not finalised or not provided. 
Time performance is treated in a similar manner as above. 
 
Time savings / (escalation) = original duration-final duration 
 
 Change in duration = original duration – final duration 
                                              Original duration 
 
Example of cost performance calculations 
 
From Annexure A – Data of abandoned projects lets us consider project No. 26, 
BDF Sector Command. 
 
Change in cost = original cost – final account or paid –to-date 
                                       Original cost 
 
Change in cost = 7, 299, 479 – 12, 766, 520 
                                  7, 299, 479 
 
                  =0.749(100%) =75% additional cost 
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Change in duration = original duration – final duration 
                                            Original duration 
 
                       = 12 months – 67months 
                                12 months 
                     =4.58 (100%) = 458% additional time elapsed  
 
The above figures seem scary, but they reflect how national resources are being 
mismanaged on project implementation. Some projects listed in Annexure A as 
abandoned are not yet completed because government is looking for additional 
funds to complete those projects. 
 
Figure 4.1 Cost Performance Analysis 
        
Project Name Original cost  Final cost     
Tsabong Tribal District Admin.  1929909 2024809      
Dental Oral Health Unit 12965887 16631395      
Jwaneng Technical college 5909432 7939192      
Palapye Technical College 8907600 12215724      
BDF Sector Command  7299479 12766520      
Madiba Senior Sec. School 24800000 40028282      
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Figure 4.2 – Time Performance Analysis 
 
 
 
Project names 
Original Contract 
Period( months) 
Contract Period 
Elapsed (months) 
Tsabong Tribal District Admin.  5 56 
Dental Oral Health Unit 10 68 
Jwaneng Technical college 12 30 
Palapye Technical College 10 11 
BDF Sector Command  49 116 
Madiba Senior Sec. School 20 62 
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Table 4.1 Summary of Implemented Projects by DBES as shown in Annexure A  
Table 4.2.1 to 4.2.17  
 
Source: DBES 2004  
 
 
The above examples of figure 4.1, figure 4.2 and table 4.1 indicate the underlying 
seriousness of the whole situation in the country’s construction industry and its 
undesirable results. It also underpins the urgent need for the establishment of 
institutional and organisational development programmes within the public sector in 
order to promote or foster long-term national interest and visions.  In view of the 
literature review, someone can conclude that the current situation emanates from 
lack of institutional capacity.  
 
The study has not pinpointed causes of poor performance and of abandonment of 
projects by citizen contractors, but with reference of what was revealed in literature 
review, conclusions can be summed. In 2005 Botswana Confederation of 
Commerce Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM) construction sector engaged The 
University of Botswana to conduct on the “Causes of Poor Performance of Public 
Construction Projects in Botswana. Ssegawa ‘et al’ (2005; page 37-60) says that 
Ministry of 
 Projects 
with no 
data 
Projects 
Completed 
on time 
Projects with 
time 
overruns 
Projects 
abandoned 
Total 
No. of 
projects  
Time 
overruns % 
Projects 
completed 
within 
budget 
Project 
with 
escalation 
Cost 
overruns 
 % 
Labour & 
Home Affairs  
3 1 14 1 19 74 % 6 12 68 % 
 
Health 
 
4 
 
1 
 
18 
 
4 
 
27 
 
96 % 
 
9 
 
14 
 
67 % 
 
Agriculture 
 
1 
 
0 
 
18 
 
3 
 
22 
 
100 % 
 
7 
 
12 
 
68 % 
Finance & 
Dev. 
 
 
0 
 
4 
 
4 
 
1 
 
9 
 
44 % 
 
4 
 
4 
 
56 % 
Mineral 
Energy 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
0 
 
2 
 
100 % 
 
1 
 
1 
 
50 % 
Environment 
Wildlife 
6 0 7 3 16 63 % 9 4 44 % 
Local 
Government 
0 0 2 11 13 100 %  2 0 85 % 
Lands & 
Housing 
1 0 6 0 7 86 % 0 6 86 % 
Trade & 
Industry 
3 0 0 0 3 0 2 1 33 % 
Works & 
Transport 
0 2 11 1 14 86 % 6 7 57 % 
Education 2 6 40 5 53 75 % 13 35 66 % 
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projects go through two major phases namely, Planning and Implementation, 
therefore, causes of failure can be found at both phases. He argues that citizen 
contractors have been blamed for non-performance on Public Projects even where 
the cause of failure originate from the planning phase of the project. For example, 
projects that were on NDP 6 and 7 were delayed because of lack of institutional 
capacity at planning stage therefore, those projects never reached tender stage. 
The backlog resulted in spilling over to NDP 9. This situation has led to various 
problems; 
• Delivery of educational facilities has been delayed or not been executed at 
all. As a result, public officials and politicians blame contractors for delays 
when it is clear that it is a planning problem caused by Government officials. 
• Lack of implementation of policies of schemes put in place by Government to 
assist citizen contractors. 
• Lack of synchronised mechanism for policy formulation and follow up to 
regulate, control and develop the industry. 
• Lack of knowledge of policies by Government officials, one good example is 
the policy on interest to be paid contractors on delayed payments. While 
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) issued this directive, 
Ministry of Works and Transport (MWT) and Ministry of Local Government 
and Lands do not implement the directive, and this has caused confusion on 
the interest payments. 
The above brief summary gives evidence of lack of institutional capacity and that the 
construction industry should be consolidated under one Controlling Body. 
   
In the period between 2003 and 2006 there had minimal if any activities in terms of 
implementation of government developments due to lack of institutional and 
organisational capacity at the Department of Buildings and Engineering Services.  
Funds allocated for such projects were returned unutilised. This problem had an 
adverse impact on the economy, many people were retrenched, businesses closed 
or relocated to neighbouring South Africa. 
 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the government has established 
development project implementation units in each ministry for the expedition of 
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project implementation. These various units will still report to the Director of 
Buildings and Engineering Services. The DBES has however been declared to be 
under-capacity.  
The current intervention schemes do not address the following shortcomings: 
 
• The registration of contractors is not adequately structured and used to 
promote continuous development of contractor’s performance. 
• Contractor development interventions tend to be ad-hoc and lack strategic 
perspective to direct contractors over the development programme in the long 
term. 
• Mentorship schemes, where they exist, are inadequately structured to develop 
enterprises into sustainable businesses. 
• There is no differentiation between contractor development and poverty 
alleviation programmes.  Therefore, it becomes difficult to evaluate the success 
of the contractor development. 
 
South Africa’s policy of black economic empowerment (BEE) is considered by this 
report as the best model so far for any developing country that endeavours to 
empower its citizens economically and socially. South Africa realised that for the 
country to reach its maximum economic potential, all citizens should have 
meaningful participation.  So the government paid attention across all departments 
to issues relating to skills, vacancies and delegation of responsibilities to managers 
of delivery agencies.  Their strategy approach assessed the possible root causes of 
skill scarcity and identified those students from then disadvantaged groups who 
required some help in maths and science subjects. For example, in 2005 the 
government increased the number of schools dedicated to maths and science from 
102 to 529, with the intention to increase the skill base in technical professions such 
as engineering (Alexander, 2006; page1-2).  
 
It is of paramount importance that the government of Botswana should act now by 
mobilising its citizens to participate fully in every opportunity of the economy.   
 
 
 97 
 
CHAPTER 5: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
5.1 Summary 
 
Since the early 1970’s, the government has been the driver of “Citizen 
Empowerment” or citizen contractor development.  The study has established the 
fact that the Government has not yet localised the industry within the public sector.  
The government has introduced various interventions on citizen contractor 
development, which is a component of citizen empowerment policy, in Botswana. 
However, all interventions lacked structured contractor development programmes, 
which enable training, mentoring, continuous assessment of contractor performance 
and grading.  At present there is no accountability either by the participating citizen 
contractors or by implementation agents, which results in cost escalations due to 
overrun and abandoned projects.   
 
This study has learned that Government’s support is concentrated on two aspects, 
which are financial support and ensuring that citizen contractors are awarded at 
least 30 per cent of projects.  This overlooks the necessary development in technical 
and managerial / entrepreneurship skills, and thus result in poor performance and 
abandonment of projects. 
 
For government objectives on citizen contractor development to be realised, they 
must be implemented as a proper development programme or project, with an 
appropriate institutional capacity for strategic planning, controlling, and training, 
mentoring, monitoring and evaluating rather than administering the policies on an 
ad-hoc basis. 
 
It would appear as if government efforts are fragmented throughout various 
Ministries and departments, and need to be consolidated under one umbrella body 
for easy management and assessment, there should be a ministry or statutory body 
responsible for all Public Works.  According to the chairperson of The Controlling 
Body of the 30 % reservation directive (CAB 32B), their mandate is to ensure that 30 
% Project Reservation policy is met in terms of project allocation to citizens. 
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Thereafter, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, etc. are the responsibilities of 
procuring entities. 
 
The study has revealed that Ministries and departments with the mandate of 
implementing Government objectives still rely heavily on expatriates.  Therefore, 
once expatriates leave, projects suffer lack of continuity in the implementation of 
projects. As revealed by the literature review on institutional and organisational 
development, it is understandable why it is important for each country to base 
development programmes on local human resource. 
 
A radical change in the localisation programme is imperative.  The Government 
must set up a localisation programme especially for scarce technical/professional 
skills in the construction industry within the public sector.  The programme should be 
long-term with milestones set in order to measure progress at certain intervals as it 
is done in Singapore. This approach will require a close cooperation between 
Government and the private sector where mentorship can be facilitated by 
secondment between the two sectors. 
 
The above approach could open an opportunity for those who have joined the 
private sector to re-join public services if the Government can review its 
career/professional path development policies and bridge the salary gap between 
expatriates and citizens.  This matter requires serious consideration by all 
stakeholders, especially the Government if the construction industry is considered to 
be playing an important role in the country’s economy. As discussed on chapter 2 
Singapore embarked on the development of professionals and encouraged 
contractors to employ professional. 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
 
1. Small (citizen) contractor development programmes are essential for 
sustainable contractor growth, which effectively contributes socio-economic 
benefits to the entire society. Botswana is considered to be a middle- income 
country with a fast growing economy, with sustainable infrastructure 
development projects, but the country has been unable to fully utilise its 
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potential by effectively mobilising its local human resources in order for them to 
have meaningful participation in the economy. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
many developing countries, with the assistance of international organisations 
such as ILO and World Bank have successfully developed their construction 
industry to a level where it creates employment opportunities for its citizens. 
 
2. Notwithstanding the fact that Botswana has an escalating rate of 
unemployment, especially among youths (unskilled, skilled and professionals), 
it would appear as if the government does not have ability ultimately to utilise 
the on going infrastructure development projects on developing the 
construction industry to be economically sustainable.  After 40 years of 
independence many infrastructure development projects have failed to develop 
local human resources to have a meaningful participation in the industry, which 
bears socio-economic benefits to the entire society. 
 
3. It is regrettable to note that Government’s citizen empowerment initiatives 
sound to be very good when are said, but in reality it has proved to be merely 
lip service due to lack of institutional and organisational capacity for 
implementation; lack of long term political support and lack of continuity 
because of heavy reliance on expatriates rather than focusing on citizens and 
strategically training them to control the construction industry. It has been 
observed that the government seems to be focusing only on service delivery 
and neglecting its social obligation and the welfare of its people in favour of 
expatriates. According to Paratian (2005, pp.16) Botswana Government policy 
(National Development Plan 8 and 9) called for the creation of “meaningful 
employment, involvement of the private sector in the building of the economy 
and greater use of locally available resources…., where economical and 
technically feasible". The literature review has revealed that without statutory 
regulations and a controlling Body, the above is not achievable. 
 
4. It has been observed that expatriates are given better incentives than citizens.  
These include accommodation, an expatriate allowance and a minimum of 25 
% of accumulative salary at the end of their contract, while citizens get a basic 
salary and pension at 50 years of age upon early retirement. 
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5. At present there is no localisation programme in place at DBES with a defined 
career path or career development which can serve as an incentive for young 
professionals to stay in the department.  
 
6. It is clear that the main objectives of the Botswana Citizen Contractor 
interventions are not well defined in terms of what is be achieved, when, how 
and by whom. As stated earlier, Botswana subscribes to ILO, the one of 
international organisations that encourages and support developing countries 
with their expertise and resources to mobilise local human and materials 
resource in order to develop a sustainable socio-economic benefit to the nation 
by providing employment opportunities. It is evident that Botswana’s approach 
does not comply with the above mentioned concepts.       
 
5.3 Recommendations 
 
1. After reviewing development programmes undertaken in other developing 
countries, the urgency of establishing an institutional and organisational 
development programme can not be over emphasised. The existing project 
data has revealed excessive expenditure by Government on cost escalations 
emanating from Project overruns and abandoned projects.  The Government’s 
extra expenditure could be used to improve the life of Batswana people. 
 
2. Botswana should embark on the establishment of a statutory body to champion 
construction industry development which must have strategic programmes to 
promote the development of skills, in particular managerial skills, to enable 
entrepreneurs to run their companies profitably and in a sustainable manner. 
This means that registration of contractors and the contractor development 
programmes or models should be carefully integrated in a streamlined effort 
designed to build a contractor’s capacity to grow and compete.  
 
3. The government should take the lead in the empowerment (development) 
endeavour by reviving localisation programmes.  It has been revealed that key 
decision making positions both in Local and Central Government are still held 
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by expatriates. Therefore it must be understood and appreciated that 
sustainable construction is an approach that the building industry must move 
forward thereby achieving sustainable development, taking into account socio-
economic, cultural and environmental issues.  The Government should 
spearhead that development. 
 
4. All stakeholders must be informed about Government objectives on citizen 
contractor development in order for them to understand the fundamental 
principles of the programme so as feel that they are part of the whole process. 
 
5. All parties should be made to understand the importance of accountability on 
performance and service delivery.  People should understand that the mission 
is employment creation for all citizens, but not enrichment for certain 
individuals who happen to be in the construction industry. Information is a vital 
tool in society, a well informed community will support government initiatives 
geared to improve their lives, and they will assist government in fighting 
against any corruption, which is reported be to rapidly increasing.  
 
6. Institutional and Organisational system establishment will form part of legal 
instruments which will enable watchdogs such as the Directorate on Corruption 
and Economic Crime to fight against fronting or any form of corruption.   
 
7. Citizen contractors should be encouraged to employ the services of University 
of Botswana graduates in construction related fields to enhance capabilities 
and skills in order to compete in an open market. 
 
8. The Government should also target and encourage graduates into this sector 
because they do have potential to understand the logistics of the operations of 
a contractor better than most of the on job trained contractors. 
 
9. Contractors who fail to meet the requirements set forth for the citizen 
contractor development programme, or fail to meet acceptable performance 
and delivery standards must be dropped from the assistance scheme. 
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10. This approach will take the local construction industry to new heights, by 
enabling new generation contractors to understand new technology and 
construction language, which can contribute to joint-venture arrangements and 
expedition transfer of skills. 
 
 
103 
 
 
 
 
Source: DBES 2004 
ANNEXURE A - Data of abandoned Projects between January 2000 and September 2005 
s/n Cit/ 
Non 
cit 
Project Description Contract 
Commerce 
Determina- 
tion Date 
Contract 
Complete 
(original) 
Original 
Contract 
Sum (paid 
to date) 
Contract 
Commence 
Contract 
Complete 
Contract 
Sum 
Additional 
Consultancy 
Fee 
Total 
Add. 
Cost 
borne by 
Govt 
Time lapse 
from 
original  
completion 
date 
Remarks 
1 Cit Palapye Tribal &  
District Admin  
Housing 
24.05.99 27.04.02 21.02.00 1,491,653 
(1027,547) 
02.09.02 30.04.03 282,000 Nil -182,106 3yr  
2mth 
Project under maintenance 
2 Cit Tsabong Tribal & 
 District Admin  
Housing 
01.03.99 10.06.02 16.08.99 1,929,909 
(989,948) 
05.08.02 02.04.04 1,034,861 Nil 94,900 4yr 
 8mth 
Project under maintenance 
3 Cit Inalegolo Tribal & 
 District Admin  
Housing 
28.03.99 18.06.02 15.09.99 177,998 
(132,401) 
07.11.02 28.03.03 - Nil Nil 3yrs  
10 moths 
98% complete, project awaiting 
additional funding for completion  
4 Cit Bokspits Tribal & 
 District Admin  
Housing 
28.04.99 04.06.99 15.09.99 201,513 
(30,227) 
05.08.02 02.04.04 - Nil Nil 4yr  
9mth 
Project under Maintenance 
5 Cit Hukuntsi Tribal &  
District Admin  
Housing 
01.03.99 17.06.02 21.06.99 456,182 
(254,435) 
07.10.02 28.02.03 - Nil Nil 4yrs 92% complete, project awaiting 
additional 
6 Cit Oodi Tribal & 
District  
Admin Housing 
31.05.99 31.08.99 13.05.02 270,801 
(269,519) 
15.08.02 30.10.02 69,197 Nil 31,061 5 mth 
7 Cit Leshibitse Tribal &  
District Admin  
Housing 
12.04.99 13.05.02 21.07.99 145,917 
(109063) 
   Nil  3yrs 
 3mth 
 
 
Project under  maintenance 
8 cit Gumare Tribal & 
District Admin  
Housing 
12.07.99 29.05.02 27.03.00 1,603,728 
(428547) 
02.09.02 08.08.03 1,943,127 Nil 767,949 3yr 
 5 
 
Project under  
maintenance 
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 ANNEXURE A continues 
 
 
9 Cit Tlhareseleele Tribal  
& District Admin 
 Housing 
22.03.99 20.05.02 12.08.99 150,014 
(135,503) 
12.08.02 29.11.02 206,078 Nil  294,569 3yr 
3 
 
 
10 
 
Cit 
Good Hope Tribal &  
District Admin 
 Housing 
08.02.99 20.05.02 06.09.99 1,639,814 
(1750,635) 
12.08.02 24.01.03  Nil  3yr 
 4 
11 Cit Cwagare Tribal & 
 District Admin 
 Housing 
08.02.99 20.05.02 16.08.99 138,320 
(130,501) 
12.08.02 
 
 
29.11.04  Nil  3yrs 
3mt 
 
12 Cit Staff Housing for 
Dept. of Supplies at  
Kasane 
15.01.02 10.02.03 10.02.03 1,486,102 
(908,772) 
17.05.04 28.06.04 2,039,335 67,225 1,529,230 1yr 
3mth 
100% complete, defects liability period 
has 
 elapsed, final inspection ongoing 
13 Cit Dental Oral Health 
Unit 
18.10.99 15.10.01 03.08.00 12,965,887 
(9,782,172) 
29.03.04 04.09.04 6,839,223 Nil 3,655,508 4yr 
10m 
100% complete, defects liability period 
has just 
 started 
14 Cit Rakops Hospital  
Housing 
11.06.01 16.06.03 27.01.02 3,226,961 
(2,444,298) 
05.09.05 0602.06 4,787,310 800,000 4,480,647 3yr 
 4mth 
60% complete & on schedule 
15 Cit Proposed Police 
Housing at 
 Moshupa 
11.11.02 07.04.04 26.11.03 3,414,939 
(787,962) 
07.03.05 22.08.05 4,700,000 297,183 2,111,775 1yr 
 8m 
96% complete & out of schedule 
16 Cit Alterations & 
Additions to Madiba 
 SSS 
01.11.99 15.10.01 21.04.01 24,500,000
) 
05.01.04 3101.05 31,953,500 755,700 16,004,322 3yrs 
12 m 
97% complete, progress is still 
insignificant 
17 Cit Alterations & 
Additions to F/town 
SSS 
15.02.00 15.10.01 29.10.01 24,800,000 
(7,785,066) 
17.03.04 2505.05 31,497,416 745,800 15,228,282 3yrs 
 6mth 
95%.complete & slightly delayed. 
18 Cit Alterations & 
Additions to 
Masunga  SSS  
15.06.02 26.08.03 24.09.02 7,500,000 
(3,631,221) 
08.11.04 04.11.05 8,694,192 332,906 5,158,319 2yrs  
8mth 
87% complete & on schedule 
19 Non 
Cit 
Maun District 
Hospital– Electrical 
Subcontract  
16.07.03 22.04.04 27.07.06 23,953,146 
(601,084) 
19.04.04 19.02.06 n/a Nil 625,000 (1yr) 70% complete, for the all works (main 
+ sub- 
contract) 
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ANNEXURE A continues 
 
 
20 Non 
Cit  
Letlhakane Primary 
Hosp – Electrical 
Sub 
Contr 
30.06.03 21.05.04 20.03.04 823,192 
(138,386) 
21.05.04 20.03.04 n/a NIL Nil 1yr  
3mth 
100% complete, defects liability 
period ends in September  2005 
21 Non 
Cit  
Maintenance of 
Game Proof Electric 
 Fence at 
Pandamatenga 
farms 
00.11.03 13.07.04 00.10.04 299,400 02.08.04 30.08.04 390,772 NIL 91,372 Nil 100% complete, defects liability 
period has  
elapsed 
22 Cit DEMS Workshop at 
 Selebi Phikwe 
01.04.98 04.11.04 31.05.02 535,400 
(418,000) 
 
23.05.05 18.07.05 129,600 NIL 12,200 3yr  
3mth 
100% complete, defects liability  
period ends in January 2006 
23 Cit  DWNP Trophy 
Store 
at Gaborone 
03.02.03 12.07.04 21.11.03 1,125,594 
(657,463) 
09.02.05 08.08.05 856,060 10,000 487,929 1yr  
7mth 
95% complete, extension of time 
claim in progress 
 
24 
Cit Artificial 
Insemination  
Centre at 
Ramatlabama  
25.02.02 21.10.04 13.06.03 6,206,600 
(3,125,915) 
TBA TBA 5,515,000 858,000 4,769,315 1yr  
9mth 
60% complete at termination, re-
tender 
documents due for  
completion in October ‘05 
25 Cit Livestock Advisory 
Centre at 
 Goodhope 
03.07.00 17.11.04 24.04.01 2,000,000 
(1,148,140) 
TBA TBA 2,300,000 100,000 1,588,140 4 yr 60% complete at termination, re-
tender  
documents due for  
completion in October 05  
26 Cit BDF Sector 
Command 
03.09.98 15.10.02 06.09.99 7,299,479 
(7,648,920) 
04.02.04 20.09.04 4,977,600 140,000 5,467,041 5yr  
7mth 
99% complete, mechanical 
contractor is busy completing the 
outstanding 
27 Cit Jwaneng Technical 
College 
13.10.03 02.03.05 05.01.04 5,959,432 
(2,059,293) 
15.08.05 14.04.06 5,619,900 250,000 1,969,761 1yr 
 6mth 
51% complete & on schedule 
28 Cit Palapye Technical 
College 
10.05.04 02.03.05 09.06.05 8,907,600 
(1,296,055) 
09.08.05 02.10.06 10,519,669 400,000 3,308,124 1 mth The first site  meeting scheduled  
for September 2005 
29 Cit Gantsi Immigration 
Offices & Housing 
12.01.04 06.06.05 11.10.04 3,776,465 
(1,368,138) 
TBA TBA TBA TBA TBA 9 mth 23% complete at termination & 
valuation of works done completed 
in August 2005 
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TABLE 4.2.1 - A SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR GREATER    
    Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
   Duration  Overrun  Time Cost (P) (P) (P) 
      (mths) (mths) (mths)       
 1 Examination Council Building 18 -4  34,855,922.94 -942,731.06  
 2 Swaneng Hill School Serowe 26  0 22,674,624.85 -5,198,685.00  
 3 Ghanzi SSS-Staff Housing 8 -4  4,816,428.50  273,629.68 
 4 Kgari Sechele SSS – Molepolole 11 -9  19,168,840.36 -188,690.19  
 5 Tutume McConnel Upgrading - Phase II 15 -16  33,824,734.00 -2,102,863.50  
 6 Non-formal Education Centre - Kang 18 -11  22,880,600.00  38,200.00 
 7 Shashe River SSS – Shashe No data   29,144,322.00 -6,649,800.00  
 8 Tonota College of Education 13 -9  13,054,551.24 -455,363.85  
 9 Molepolole College of Education 18 -13  16,393,365.00 -2,280,384.82  
 10 Shoshong SSS Staff Housing - Shoshong 12 -4  8,481,357.75 -46,009.00  
 11 Ext to Moshupa SSS at Moshupa - Phase II 16 -10  24,108,000.00 -46,009.00  
 12 Ext to Seepapitso SSS at Kanye 15 -17  14,157,708.82 -763,825.18  
 13 Lobatse SSS 17 -6  39,141,940.00  7,805,876.00 
 14 Kagiso SSS – Ramotswa 17 -12  22,809,934.00 -5,594,077.44  
 15 Matshekge SSS 19 -18  39,926,396.00 -2,846,349.40  
 16 Naledi SSS – Gaborone 15 -18  27,630,000.00 -2,910,583.00  
 17 Botswana College of Distance Learning 16   18,570,308.00 2,449,582.25  
 18 Ext. Renov. & Alt to Matsha Com. College 17 -4  33,676,392.00 -9,761,416.57  
 19 Education Centre at Kanye 16   28,150,000.00  188,156.95 
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 20 Matshekge Hill SSS - Advance contract 13 -11  6,917,875.00  274,213.33 
 21 Upgrading at Serowe Teacher Training College 18 -10  16,100,000.00 -2,325,266.75  
 22 Integrated Office Block for BIAC - Gaborone 12 -15  4,614,645.00  197,377.82 
 23 New Staff Housing at GSS - Gaborone 17 -7  4,630,000.00  644,119.12 
 24 Ext to Lobatse SSS at Lobatse 12 -5  7,768,401.26 -1,872,511.34  
 25 Ext to Seepapitso SSS at Kanye 17 -10  16,081,586.58 -2,959,420.43  
 26 Ext to Moshupa SSS at Moshupa - Phase 1 7 -8  13,259,542.00 -797,319.00  
 27 Upgrading & Extensions to GSS 11 -8  16,583,100.30 -4,324,444.11  
 28 Ext to S/Phikwe SSS - Phase II 16 -8  21,333,321.66 -1,328,711.93  
 29 Lotsane Senior Secondary School 30 -16  29,497,968.00 -3,007,598.80  
 30 Ledumang SSS No data   11,763,312.00 -753,902.00  
abandoned 31 VTC upgrading Housing Jwaneng       5,959,431.75 4,803,310.00   
abandoned 32 Masunga SSS Staff housing & remedial works     7,522,103.00 3,011,084.05   
abandoned 33 VTC upgrading - Housing Palapye       8,907,599.87 15,248,622.00   
abandoned 34 Alterations and Additions to Madiba SSS     24,500,000.00 14,482,482.00   
abandoned 35 Alterations and Additions to Ftown SSS     24,800,000.00     
    No data     2 No data   0 
  Projects within schedule   3 Projects within budget 7 
  Projects with time overruns   25 Projects with escalation 23 
  Abandoned   5 Abandoned  5 
  Total   35 Total  35 
  Percentage time overruns within both time & cost   71% Percentage cost overruns 80% 
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TABLE 4.2.2 - SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF THE STATE PRESIDENT AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR GREATER 
 
 
        
    Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
  
 Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
    
  (mths) (mths) (mths)       
 1 State House Pool Rehabilitation 4 -2  2,558,268.56  122,495.56 
 2 DCEC Head Quarters 10 -4  18,700,000.00 -1,993,716.31  
 3 Police College at Otse 32 -5  191,200,000.00  2,614,887.80 
 4 Police Housing at Kanye 9 -14  8,950,000.00 -3,275,902.15  
 5 Police Station at Kanye 10 -6  11,300,000.00 -691,780.04  
 6 Police Station at Kasane 17 -9  16,150,000.00 -1,075,302.20  
 7 Police Station and Housing at Mabutsane 11 -8  9,900,000.00 -1,116,701.00  
 8 ILEA at Otse 13 -3  41,000,000.00  1,782,740.00 
 9 Iprovements to Police Station at  18 -13  27,312,379.75 -673,530.25  
 10 Improvements to Police Station at 12 -8  14,417,808.00 -1,872,816.05  
 11 Improvements to Police Station at 14 -7  25,673,535.10  165,431.70 
 12 Improvements to Police Station at 13 -10  17,897,985.79  2,206,438.79 
 13 Police Housing at Thamaga 8 -10  2,997,763.80 -333,403.20  
 14 Police Housing at Lobatse 6 -15  4,434,036.10 -3,823,313.90  
 15 Police Housing at Gweta 11 -19  1,451,352.80  532,574.42 
 16 Police Housing at Selibe-Phikwe - Phase II 10 -16  6,240,414.80 -769,658.20  
 17 Police Station at Tonota 10 -7  14,606,013.20  615,468.65 
 18 Police Camp at Tlokweng no data   3,700,000.00 -1,211,079.15  
 19 SSG Flats at Gaborone 17  0 19,100,000.00 -793,709.45  
 20 Police Station & Housing at Charles Hill 13 -25  22,915,325.86 -2,690,794.24  
 21 Rural Police Station & Housing at Rakops 12 -7  10,964,201.00 -93,458.25  
 22 Thebephatshwa Engine Test Facility 12  0 7,400,000.00  2,476,309.80 
 23 Glen Valley - Phase IV A 24 -16  28,100,988.50 -10,179,269.35  
 24 Glen Valley - Phase IV B 12 -10  17,697,319.80 -554,915.53  
 25 Village Garrison Phase II 18 -3  29,980,000.00  4,708,049.00 
 26 Magistrate's Court at Village, Gaborone 9 -13  4,792,107.40 -1,357,044.91  
 27 Magistrate's Court at Selibe Phikwe 11 -13  5,160,000.00 -941,410.83  
 28 Magistrate's Court at Palapye 12 -11  5,531,883.00 -2,272,131.77  
 29 Magistrate's Court at Tsabong 11 -3  7,387,716.00 -1,819,083.50  
 30 Magistrate's Court at Mochudi 12 -11  11,863,406.60 -3,171,928.40  
 31 Magistrate's Court at Molepolole 12 -5  15,223,010.45 -4,145,834.55  
 32 Magistrate's Court at Maun 14 -6  10,179,905.00 -102,117.00  
 33 High Court at Francistown 17 -8  36,095,401.00 -7,816.00  
 109
 34 Houses and Flats at Thebephatshwa IIIA 14 -14  23,687,610.00 -2,697,462.56  
 35 Houses at Village Garrison for BDF - Gaborone 9 -13  7,873,670.80 -3,456,549.40  
 36 Extension to Ramotswa Police Station 13 -3  6,815,004.34 -992,259.76  
 37 Renovations to Existing Ramotswa Police Station 4  0 461,437.00  46,385.55 
 38 Rural Police Station & Housing - Takatokwane 11 -8  4,181,911.42 -1,453,001.25  
 39 Rural Police Station & Housing - Ramatlabama 10 -4  8,964,000.00 -1,156,364.60  
 40 Police Station and Housing at Serule 15 -3  24,268,951.68  1,212,261.68 
 41 Magistrate's Court at Mahalapye 12 -12  17,599,780.00 -2,099,992.00  
 42 Police Housing at Dibete 6 -15  6,352,920.00 -2,320,056.00  
 43 Judge's Houses at F/town and Lobatse no data   17,750,887.00 -1,652,648.00  
 44 Police Station and Housing at Middlepits no data   14,401,554.20 -11,909,362.50  
 45 BDF Sector Command at Francistown no data   4,977,650.92  2,632,120.92 
abandoned 46 Police Housing at Moshupa       3,414,939.30 -808,610.70   
abandoned 47 BDF Sector Command at Francistown       7,299,479.00 7,299,479.00   
    
     
    No data     4 No data   0 
  Projects within schedule   3 Projects within budget  12 
  Projects with time overruns   38 Projects with escalation  33 
  Abandoned   2 Abandoned  2 
  Total   47 Total  47 
  Percentage time overruns   81% Percentage cost overruns  74% 
    within both time and cost       
  
    
 
 
Source: DBES 2004 
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TABLE 4.2.3: SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND HOME AFFAIRS AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR GREATER 
 
 
 
       
    Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
  
 Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
    
  (mths) (mths) (mths)       
 1 Immigration Office block & Staff Houses - Masunga 9 -9  2,990,914.00 -228,974.74  
 2 MTTC Gaborone 11 -4  8,773,318.75  519,707.15 
 3 Integrated Sports Facility - Serowe 11 -20  27,865,690.00 -13,753,248.80  
 4 Integrated Sports Facility – Maun 12 -10  26,525,699.73 -10,081,764.09  
 5 Integrated Sports Facility  - Masunga 12 -12  23,492,633.11 6,764,771.45  
 6 Integrated Sports Facility, civil works - Molepolole 13 -11  7,972,439.10 4,105,338.67  
 7 Kasane Prison Electric Fence 3 -2  298,216.00 111,144.00  
 8 Prison Staff Houses at Selibe Phikwe 5 -11  2,618,053.00  107,527.00 
 9 Malapye Prison Training College 12 -11  58,782,286.00 8,576,630.85  
 10 Tshane Prison Camp 10 -9  13,417,647.75 2,467,571.25  
 11 Boro Sewage Ponds – Maun 1  0 271,244.52  18,458.92 
 12 Tsodilo Hill Museum Fence 3 -3  1,335,378.00  458,146.35 
 13 ISF Synthetic Grass – Maun 4 -3  4,459,692.00  1,596,006.05 
 14 Centre for illegal immigrants - Francistown 20 -8  36,757,237.00 4,801,114.00  
 15 National BotanIcal Gardens Gaborone - Phase 1 no data   3,062,661.90 250,167.50  
 16 National Archives & Records Centre - Ftown no data   6,682,385.00 1,877,327.03  
 17 Moshupa Boys Prison 18 -23  26,084,320.00 1,465,777.00  
 18 Prison Staff Houses at Lobatse no data   3,162,001.00  316,787.00 
abandoned 19 Prison Staff Houses at Lobatse             
         
    
     
    No data     3 No data   0 
  Projects within schedule   1 Projects within budget 6 
  Projects with time overruns   14 Projects with escalation 12 
  Abandoned   1 Abandoned  1 
  Total   19 Total  19 
  Percentage time overruns   74% Percentage cost overruns 68% 
    within both time and cost       
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TABLE 4.2.4 - SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR GREATER   Source: DBES 2004 
  
    Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
  
 Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
    
  (mths) (mths) (mths)       
         
 1 Segkoma Hospital & HIS Housing – Serowe 16 -7  24,916,067.50 -2,303,394.50  
 2 Scottish Livingstone Hospital Housing – Molepolole 9 -9  9,194,518.00 2,913,037.83  
 3 Mahalapye District Hospital Housing 16 -5  17,136,000.00 417,283.00  
 4 Maun District Hospital Type III Houses (Doctors) 12 -8  13,428,060.34  77,521.14 
 5 Thamaga Primary Hospital Housing 9 -3  6,372,353.90  844,209.30 
 6 Ghanzi Primary Hospital Housing 12 -5  12,261,886.60 3,513,569.60  
 7 Lobatse Mental Staff Housing 11 -4  10,574,068.00 1,663,442.00  
 8 Bobonong Primary Hospital Staff Housing 8 -10  4,645,665.20 616,628.15  
 9 Mmadinare Primary Hospital Staff Housing 8 -8  5,346,656.70  447,196.08 
 10 Letlhakane Primary Hospital Staff Housing 8   4,632,364.00  417,618.75 
 11 Tutume Primary Hospital Staff Housing 9 -9  5,911,081.35  244,238.36 
 12 Athlone Hospital Staff Housing Phase I – Lobatse 11 -14  15,307,281.70  576,815.32 
 13 S/phikwe Hospital Staff Housing: Phase 2 - S/Phikwe 11 -4  6,588,899.00 417,251.92  
 14 Tsabong Primary Hospital Staff Housing 7 -1  4,585,863.60 125,807.90  
 15 Molepolole HIS Housing 9 -3  11,736,115.00  245,017.30 
 16 G/Hope & Tsb Prim. Hospt Sewage Treatment 5 -1  4,599,203.95  679,893.75 
 17 Gaborone NHI Auditorium Fire Damage no data   736,079.53 202,530.22  
 18 Gabs Community Sci. Health Cntr -rem. Works no data   317,732.60 17,384.65  
 19 Gaborone NHI 32 -18  25,212,787.68 20,430,166.97  
 20 Botswana Harvard HIV Lab – Gaborone no data   11,461,858.65 297,012.75  
 21 S/phikwe Hospital Staff Housing: Phase 1 - S/Phikwe 11 -4  5,936,558.80  188,084.33 
 22 Maun Hospital Staff Housing - Phase 1 - S/Phikwe 11 -19  8,698,633.00 -39,317.05  
abandoned 23 Oral Health Unit PMH – Gaborone       12,965,887.20 -3,798,604.45   
abandoned 24 Rakops Hospital Housing       3,226,961.00     
abandoned 25 Maun District Hospital - Electrical Sub contract       23,953,146.00     
abandoned 26 Letlhakane Primary Hosp - Electrical Sub Contr       823,192.00     
         
    No data     4 
No data 
  0 
  Projects within schedule   1 Projects within budget 9 
  Projects with time overruns   18 Projects with escalation 14 
  Abandoned   4 Abandoned  4 
  Total   27 Total  27 
  Percentage time overruns   96% Percentage cost overruns 67% 
    within both time and cost       
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TABLE 4.2.5: SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR GREATER 
 
    Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
  
 Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
    
  (mths) (mths) (mths)       
  
 
  
 
 
  
 1 National Vet. Lab. At Sebele AGR/GAB/3 12 -12  6,723,888.00 -507,395.85  
 2 Small Stocks Field Stations at Lobu. 15 -14  12,538,000.00 -1,803,403.60  
 3 LMCC & Kraal at S/Phikwe 9 -8  1,563,387.00  67,757.15 
 4 L/Stock Adv. Cntr Staff Housing & Whouse – Taka 6 -9  1,648,546.00 -212,426.00  
 5 Regional Agric Offices – Serowe 9 -9  9,646,891.00 -2,964,677.44  
 6 Regional Agric Offices – Francistown 11 -7  6,900,000.00 -503,457.30  
 7 Distric Agriculture offices – Tonota 7 -4  1,553,433.00 -183,370.10  
 8 Horticulture Market – Francistown 6 -12  2,267,725.80 -361,736.68  
 9 Research Centre Impala Ranch – Francistown 12 -12  2,930,168.00 -268,390.60  
 10 Storeroom at Veterinary Offices in Palapye 4 -5  132,343.75 17,314.04 17,314.04 
 11 National Tree Seed Centre, APRU, RTC Hses 12 -2  1,927,215.45 116,127.14 116.127.14 
 12 Cooperative Offices in Molepolole 3 -4  487,653.00 15,741.60 15.741.6 
 13 Cooperative Offices at Mochudi 5   398,281.00 18,627.70 18,627.70 
 14 Staff Housing & Whouse for LAC at Masunga 6 -10  1,459,473.60 -237,298.60  
 15 District Vet, Coop Offices & Staff Hses – kasane 9 -9  2,966,826.06  545,306.66 
 16 Maun Regional Agric Office & Ngamiland RTC 10 -11  3,858,925.98 -667,679.49  
 17 Storeroom at Veterinary Offices in Molepolole 4 -5  116,090.75 -3,546.71  
 18 4 No. medium Hses at Research Stn – Panda 7 -13  1,555,787.00  390,359.50 
 19 Fruit Tree Nursery – Tonota 8 -11  1,369,974.00 -44,155.00  
abandoned 20 Milk Collection Centre at Pitshane       430,362.57 -44,155.00   
abandoned 21 Al Centre at Ramatlabama       6,206,600.00 -1,844,731.43   
abandoned 22 L/stock Advisory Cntr Staff Houses – Ghope       2,000,000.00     
  
       
    No data     1 No data   0 
  Projects within schedule   0 Projects within budget  7 
  Projects with time overruns   18 Projects with escalation  12 
  Abandoned   3 Abandoned  3 
  Total   22 Total  22 
  Percentage time overruns   100% Percentage cost overruns  68% 
    within both time and cost       
  
    
 
 
Source: DBES 2004 
 113
 
 
 
TABLE 4.2.6: SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR 
GREATER 
 
    Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
  
 Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
    
  (mths) (mths) (mths)       
 1 Renov and Refurb of Kazungula Road & Ferry-CBP 1  0 209,087.00   
 2 Renov and Refurb of Ramokgwebana Cust Bdr Pst 1  0 272,874.80   
 3 Department of Supplies Houses – Kasane 1  0 400,000.00 -173,019.00  
 4 AG's Revenue Office & Staff Houses – Moleps 11 -6  10,301,204.00  2,717,836.00 
 5 AG's Revenue Office & Staff Houses – Moch 8 -10  10,029,667.00  4,996,665.00 
 6 Regional HQ for Customs - S-Phikwe 12 -4  8,111,593.20 547,845.56  
 7 Upgrading of Martins Drift Border Post 10  0 13,975,846.40 1,970,114.60  
 8 Regional HQ for Customs - F/town 12 -2  8,350,000.00 -449,010.15  
abondoned 9 Department of Supplies Houses – Kasane       1,486,102.00 -553,233.00   
 
        
    No data     0 No data   0 
  Projects within schedule   4 Projects within budget  4 
  Projects with time overruns   4 Projects with escalation  4 
  Abandoned   1 Abandoned  1 
  Total   9 Total  9 
  Percentage time overruns within both time and costs   44% Percentage cost overruns  56% 
 
 
Source: DBES 2004 
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TABLE 4.2.7: SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF MINERAL ENERGY AND WATER AFFAIRS AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR 
GREATER 
 
 
        
    Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
  
 Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
    
  (mths) (mths) (mths)       
  
       
 1 DGS Core Shed at Kang 12 -1  7,696,655.56  684,857.40 
 2 Lift & Stockyard - DWA HQs 9 -1  2,412,154.08 -1,089,849.90  
 
        
    No data     0 No data   0 
  Projects within schedule   0 Projects within budget  1 
  Projects with time overruns   2 Projects with escalation  1 
  Abandoned   0 Abandoned  0 
  Total   2 Total  2 
  Percentage time overruns within both time and costs   100% Percentage cost overruns  50% 
 
Source: DBES 2004 
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TABLE 4.2.8: SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT WILDLIFE AND TOURISM AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR 
GREATER 
 
 
    Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
  
 Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
    
  (mths) (mths) (mths)       
 1 Centre & Staff Houses for Met Services – Werda 9 -13  5,160,816.00 -560,601.88  
 2 Centre & Staff Houses for Met Services - G/Hope 9 -27  4,158,207.35 -141,989.35  
 3 Radar Station for Dept of Met Services – Bokaa 6 -12  1,163,110.00  184,371.72 
 4 Regional Offices for DWNP at Mochudi 7 -11  2,443,917.75  491,003.75 
 5 Gameproof Fence - Makgadikgadi - Section C no data   9,872,177.59  279,889.69 
 6 Tourism Office Block & Staff Houses – Tsabong no data   2,350,520.92 -390,200.58  
 7 Staff Housing at Ghanzi 7 -6  3,902,678.45  931,468.35 
 8 Gameproof Fence - Makgadikgadi - Section A no data   7,715,160.42  173,426.62 
 9 Central Kgalagadi & Kutse Game Reserves 14 -3  17,894,668.05  4,570,803.65 
 10 Regional Offices for DWNP at Serowe no data   4,009,927.90 -73,376.80  
 11 Storage for DWNP at Gaborone no data   10,578,219.80  1,359,543.90 
 12 Extension & Renov to Bots WLife Training Inst. 16 -8  17,183,867.00  275,876.00 
 13 Gameproof Fence: Makgadikgadi - Section B no data   12,698,183.30  1,003,472.05 
under dispute 14 Regional Offices for DWNP at Molepolole       2,346,465.39     
abandoned 15 DWNP Trophy Store at Gaborone       1,125,594.00 -387,929.00   
abandoned 16 Maintenance of Game Proof Electric Fence at       299,400.00     
         
    No data     6 No data   0 
  Projects within schedule   0 Projects within budget 9 
  Projects with time overruns   7 Projects with escalation 4 
  Abandoned   3 Abandoned  3 
  Total   16 Total  16 
  Percentage time overruns within both time and costs   63% Percentage cost overruns 44% 
    
       
  
    
 
 
 
Source: DBES 2004 
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TABLE 4.2.9: SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR GREATER 
 
 
       
    Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
  
 Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
    
  (mths) (mths) (mths)       
 1 Monarch Customary Court – Ftown 9 -5  539079.5  15425.15 
 2 Rural Administration Centre at Mahalapye 15 -2  10425259  875773.62 
abandoned 3 Palapye Tribal and District Admin. Housing       1491653   182106 
abandoned 4 Tsabong Tribal and District Admin. Housing       1929909 -94900   
abandoned 5 Inalegolo Tribal and District Admin. Housing       177998     
abandoned 6 Bokspits Tribal and District Admin. Housing       201513     
abandoned 7 Hukuntsi Tribal and District Admin. Housing       456182     
abandoned 8 Oodi Tribal and District Admin. Housing       270801 -67915   
abandoned 9 Leshibitse Tribal and District Admin. Housing       145917   36854 
abandoned 10 Gumare Tribal and District Admin. Housing       1603728 -767946   
abandoned 11 Tlhareseleele Tribal and District Admin. Housing       150014   14511 
abandoned 12 Good Hope Tribal and District Admin. Housing       1639814 -316899   
abandoned 13 Cwagare Tribal and District Admin. Housing       138320   7819 
         
    No data     0 No data   0 
  Projects within schedule   0 Projects within budget 2 
  Projects with time overruns   2 Projects with escalation 0 
  Abandoned   11 Abandoned  11 
  Total   13 Total  13 
  Percentage time overruns within both time and costs   100% Percentage cost overruns 85% 
    
       
  
    
 
Source: DBES 2004 
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TABLE 4.2.10: SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF LANDS AND HOUSING AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR GREATER 
 
 
       
  Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
 
 Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
  
  (mths) (mths) (mths)       
 
       
1 Taxes & Ags Chambers – Gaborone 31 -29  132,226,228.00 -10,539,277.57  
2 Integrated office block – Francistown 25 -21  46,825,283.37 -10,497,813.63  
3 Regional Offices for Dept of Info. & B/casting 8 -12  4,592,216.70 -200,742.19  
4 Alt & Refurb of MoTIWT HQ - Parts A & B 8 -12  1,065,183.50 -1,079,198.90  
5 MOH HQs Building – Gaborone 27 -10  163,263,867.72 -28,573,061.03  
        
  No data     0 No data   0 
 Projects within schedule   0 Projects within budget 0 
 Projects with time overruns   5 Projects with escalation 5 
 Abandoned   0 Abandoned  0 
 Total   5 Total  5 
 Percentage time overruns within both time and costs   100% Percentage cost overruns 100% 
  
       
  
    
 
Source: DBES 2004 
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TABLE 4.2.11: SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF LANDS AND HOUSING AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR GREATER 
 
        
  Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
 
 Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
  
  (mths) (mths) (mths)       
 
       
1 Regional Offices for DIB – Serowe 8 -12  4592216.7 -79344.3  
2 Construction of Transmitter Building – Ngoma no data   700000 -120000  
 
       
  No data     1 No data   0 
 Projects within schedule   0 Projects within budget 0 
 Projects with time overruns   1 Projects with escalation 2 
 Abandoned   0 Abandoned  0 
 Total   2 Total  2 
 Percentage time overruns within both time and costs   50% Percentage cost overruns 100% 
 
 
Source: DBES 2004 
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TABLE 4.2.12: SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR GREATER 
 
 
    Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
  
 Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
    
  (mths) (mths) (mths)       
  
    
 
  
 1 Co-op Offices & Staff Houses – Ghanzi no data   2,001,467.35 -939,480.35  
 2 IFS Houses - Gumare & Kasane no data   1,741,574.87  7,744.23 
 3 MTI HQ refurbishment Phase II – Gaboronwe no data   2,018,000.00  0.00 
 
        
    No data     3 No data   0 
  Projects within schedule   0 Projects within budget  2 
  Projects with time overruns   0 
Projects with 
escalation  1 
  Abandoned   0 Abandoned  0 
  Total   3 Total  3 
  Percentage time overruns within both time and costs   0% Percentage cost overruns 33% 
    
       
  
    
         
         
 
Source: DBES 2004 
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TABLE 4.2.13: SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF WORKS AND TRANSPORT AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR GREATER 
 
 
    Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
  
 Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
    
  (mths) (mths) (mths)       
  
       
 1 Electrification of fuel point at Werda 8 -9  59,177.40 -889.7  
 2 Electrification of fuel point at Nata 16 -7  45,607.32  2547.47 
 3 Electrification of fuel point at Letlhakane 17 -5  57788.5 -3025  
 4 Electrification of fuel point at Charles Hill 18 -4  58037.21 3964.89  
 5 Retiling Maun Airport Public Concourse Area 2  0 217888 -10395  
 6 Driver Testing Grounds & Reg. Office – Serowe 8 -6  4181405.04 -888030.16  
 7 Vehicle Testing Station – Palapye 9  0 16251734  1535371 
 8 Alterations & Modification to DTGs – Palapye 5 -4  699453.7 -2930.05  
 9 Vehicle Testing Station – Lobatse 10 -4  13729994.78  2016662.33 
 10 Conversion of House to DRTs Offices – Sowa 4 -1  361112.2  59028.7 
 11 Conv. Of W/house to DRTS office – Mogoditshane 1 -2  323385.12 -30171.83  
 12 Roads Depot at Tsabong 8 -6  1593394  229659.65 
 13 Sewerage connec. To Police Houses - Old Naledi 3 -4  330876.9  26325.6 
abandoned 14 Extension of DBES workshops - Selibe Phikwe       444444.44 101085.56   
 
        
    No data     0 No data   0 
  Projects within schedule   2 Projects within budget  6 
  Projects with time overruns   11 
Projects with 
escalation  7 
  Abandoned   1 Abandoned  1 
  Total   14 Total  14 
  Percentage time overruns within both time and costs   86% Percentage cost overruns 57% 
    
       
  
    
 
 
 
Source: DBES 2004 
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TABLE 4.2.14: SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (BOIPELEGO) AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR GREATER 
 
 
    Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
  
 Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
    
  (mths) (mths) (mths)       
 1 Bokamoso CJSS, Gaborone West CJSS 12 -8  1,795,500.00 -149,820.85  
 2 Marang CJSS 12 -1  1,649,310.00 -211,438.44  
 3 Matlala CJSS ; Not Applicable 12 -11  1,060,455.10  34,559.75 
 4 Tlokweng CJSS, Not applicable 12 -7  1,212,039.32 -152,582.11  
 5 Tsodilo CJSS; Tshwaragano CJSS 10 -5  4,688,999.00 -420,177.10  
 6 Sedie CJSS & Moeti CJSS, Kutlwano CJSS & Rakops CJSS 12 -3  5,495,756.00 -1,201,057.10  
 7 Etsha CJSS, Okavango CJSS & Ngame CJSS, Chobe CJSS 12 -10  9,971,883.00 -210,338.10  
 8 Tsabolong CJSS & Kgolagano CJSS 12 -2  3,883,034.00 -557,676.05  
 9 Bonwatlou CJSS; Matsiloje CJSS; Tashata CJSS; Tonota CJSS 12 -9  5,852,865.00  837,955.00 
 10 Mokgalo CJSS, Mokobeng CJSS; Sefhare CJSS; Lerala CJSS 12  0 6,226,387.00 -295,623.00  
 11 Mmathethe CJSS, Ntwalang, Emang, Mathiba CJSS 12  0 5,712,301.00 -391,809.00  
 12 Mahupu,Lempu, Kgamanyire, Thamaga CJSS 12 -11  7,402,998.00  314,774.21 
 13 Kumakwane CJSS 12 -2  569,158.70  36,627.60 
 14 Mothomo, Pitikwe, Metsimasweu CJSS 12 -2  7,382,050.00 -119,504.50  
 15 Nkange CJSS & Pandagala CJSS, Setlalekgosi CJSS 12  0 4,812,726.00 -1,799,342.70  
 16 Mariba CJSS 12 -4  1,126,190.26  16,266.32 
 17 Matsheng CJSS & Mookane CJSS 12 -2  5,565,000.00  275,233.75 
 18 New CJSS at Mosu 10 -4  12,091,400.00 -762,340.33  
 
        
  
  No data     0 No data   0 
 
 Projects within schedule   3 Projects within budget  6 
 
 Projects with time overruns   15 Projects with escalation 12 
 
 Abandoned   0 Abandoned  0 
 
 Total   18 Total  18 
 
 Percentage time overruns within both time and costs   83% Percentage cost overruns 67% 
  
         0     
 
 
 
Source: DBES 2004 
 122
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.2.15: SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR JWANENG TOWN COUNCIL AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR GREATER 
 
 
    Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
   Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
      (mths) (mths) (mths)       
 1 Construction of sewage pump station - EU II 3 -15  144,140.00  15,697.54 
 2 Renov. Of prefab Hses & childrens park - EU I 2 -1  144,735.00 2,550.00  
 3 Constr. Of roadway, paving walkway 2 -3  613,591.00 9,221.64  
 4 market stall - CBD South Jwaneng 3 -2  106,404.50  1,289.90 
 5 Supply Installation - sewage pump 1 -3  563,695.00  897.10 
 6 Election or cover at civic centre 1 -4  26,000.00 -5,000.00  
 7 Supply & Installation - surface pumps 2 -1  192,993.00 -8,000.00  
 8 3 No. children's parks and playing grounds 4 -8  557,675.00 -23,514.94  
 9 Construction of green house 2  0 176,191.00  157.50 
 10 Supply & installation – computers 1  0 82,981.00  6.00 
 11 Exp of telementry for streetlighting and sewer 2 -1  217,916.00  9,355.00 
 12 Supply & inst of 11 No. Aircon units 1  0 84,611.00  3,175.00 
 13 Labour intensive veg cntrl & side drain cleaning services 1 -1  77,182.20  3,210.00 
 14 Re-roofing of Kgalagadi Primary School 2 -10  761,414.60 -166,188.40  
 15 Rehab of Portion of Jwana Street 3  0 789,884.29 -34,488.71  
         
    No data     0 No data   0 
  Projects within schedule   4 
Projects within 
budget  8 
  Projects with time overruns   11 Projects with escalation 7 
  Abandoned   1 Abandoned  1 
  Total   16 Total  16 
 
 Percentage time overruns within both time and costs   75% Percentage cost overruns 50% 
  
         3     
 
 
Source: DBES 2004 
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TABLE 4.2.16: SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR CITY OF FRANCISTOWN AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR GREATER 
 
 
    Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
  
 Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
    
  (months) (months) (months)       
 1 New Primary School at Tatitown 11 -5  10,486,975.00 
-
92,879,953.34 
 
 2 New Primary School including 25 TQs 9  0 no data no data  
 3 4/Double storey T/Qs 10  0 5,580,349.00  551,715.88 
 4 2 Nurses Houses 5  0 363,553.30  61,306.09 
 5 2 Nurses Houses 5  1 367,306.50  48,315.53 
 6 2 Nurses Houses 5  0 371,800.00  53,056.78 
 7 Maintenance of Treatment Works & pump st. 11  0 301,952.00 -65,206.00  
 8 Sampling and Analysis of waste-water 11  0 49,253.36  471.37 
Abandoned 9 Maintenance of Elector-Mech Equip no data no data   372,955.00 no data   
Abandoned 10 Donga Primary School no data no data   12,320,363.85 no data   
Abandoned 11 100 Core house for SHHA no data no data   2,000,000.00 no data   
 
        
 
  No data     0 No data   0 
 
 Projects within schedule   2 Projects within budget  6 
 
 Projects with time overruns   11 Projects with escalation 7 
 
 Abandoned   1 Abandoned  1 
 
 Total   14 Total  14 
 
 Percentage time overruns within both time and costs   86% Percentage cost overruns 57% 
 
         1     
 
 
Source: DBES 2004 
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TABLE 4.2.17: SAMPLE OF PROJECTS FOR DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT & DEVELOPMENT AT A COMPLETION LEVEL OF 95% OR 
GREATER    Source: DBES 2004 
 
   Project Description Original  Time Within Original Escalation Savings 
   Duration  Overrun  time cost (P) (P) (P) 
     (months) (months) (months)       
 1 Food Relief Services Depot – Letlhakeng 6 -9  1,864,427.00  377,699.00 
 2 Supply & Erec of prefab units for L/ Police Training Insti 3 -1  2,997,053.95  732,354.77 
 3 Ghanzi Mechanical Workshop 10  0 5,070,000.00  255,510.41 
 4 PSFBL Eradication - Kweneng - Pack 2 7 no data  5,214,156.67  284,624.37 
 5 PSFBL Eradication - Southern - Pack 4 10 no data  8,050,207.29  745,806.57 
 6 Council Chambers at Mochudi 9 -10  6,800,050.00 
  
(1,097,665.45)  
 7 Council Chambers at Molepolole 10 -11  8,458,820.00 
     
(787,371.00)  
 8 PSFBL Eradication - Kgalagadi  - Pack 9 6 no data  9,736,158.40  169,031.40 
 9 Council Chambers at Kanye 9 -11  8,686,514.35 
  
(1,283,095.05)  
 10 Rural Admin Centre at Charles Hill 10 -3  11,480,000.00 
  
(1,039,804.00)  
 11 PSFBL Eradication - Kweneng - Pack 1 11 no data  14,317,380.00  1,442,799.91 
 12 Rural Admin Centre at Hukuntsi 10 -12  13,491,503.00 
       
(59,567.30)  
 13 Rural Admin Centre at Gumare 10 -4  12,987,473.73 
     
(914,904.20)  
 14 Council Chambers at Serowe 12 no data  15,252,798.11  835,124.91 
 15 Rural Admin Centre at Mabutsane 13 7  15,228,288.00 
     
(224,600.00) 
 
 16 Rural Admin Centre at Palapye 10 -6  14,710,000.00 
     
(790,878.57)  
Abandoned 17 Remote Area Dweller Hostel       3,257,776.44     
Abandoned 18 Food Relief Services Depot – Palapye       1,849,832.00     
         
   No data     5 No data   0 
  Projects within schedule   1 Projects within budget  8 
  Projects with time overruns   10 Projects with escalation  8 
  Abandoned   2 Abandoned  2 
  Total   18 Total  18 
  Percentage time overruns within both time and costs   67% 
Percentage cost 
overruns  56% 
          1     
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ANNEXTURE B 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON CITIZEN CONTRACTOR DEVELOPMENT 
 
Since Independence the Botswana Government embarked on poverty alleviation 
and employment creation. 
 
The Government assisted its citizens to develop trade skills such as bricklaying, 
carpentry, plumbing etc. through Trades schools such as brigades and on the other 
hand, the government created Botswana Entrepreneurship Development Unit 
(BEDU) under the Ministry of Commerce to assist citizens to develop necessary 
managerial and entrepreneurship skills in order to access the open market. 
 
Over the years the Government has formulated policies geared towards promoting 
citizen (small) contractor development in the construction industry sector. 
 
In recent years, there have been reports that suggest that the Government 
intervention that promotes citizen contractor development has not been successful. 
Development projects have been cost overrun, abandoned by citizen contractors. 
 
 
You are kindly requested to honestly answer the following Questionnaire. You may 
use additional paper to elaborate your answer. 
 
1. Are you aware of Government intervention or policies that are intended to 
assist citizen contractor development? 
 
 a) Yes 
 
 b) No 
 
 If yes, please list them ……………………………………………………………… 
 
 …………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 …………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
2. Do you think Government objectives on these interventions or policies are 
clearly defined for all stakeholders to understand? 
 
 a) Yes 
 
 b) No 
 c) Not sure 
 
3. If your answer to question 2 is “No”, what do you think should be done to 
improve the situation? 
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 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
4. Do citizen contractor fully understand and appreciate government 
interventions? 
 
 a) Yes 
 
 b) No 
 
5. If your answer to question No. 4 is “yes”, then, what is the cause of failure?  
Explain. 
 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
6. If your answer to question No. 4 is “No” what can the government and other 
stakeholder do to ensure that citizen contractors understands government 
main goals. 
 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
7. Do Procuring Agents understand what government intend to achieve with 
policies and interventions for citizen contractor? 
  
a) Yes 
 
 b) No 
 
8. If the answer is no, what can be done?  Explain  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
9. Do the Project Implementation Departments have the necessary institutional 
capacity mentoring, monitoring and performance of contractor? 
 
a) Yes 
 
 b) No 
 
 c) Not sure 
 
10. If your answer is “No”, what can be done to improve institutional capacity of 
the project implementation departments to develop performance monitoring 
system that enable the government to identify problems that are faced by 
citizen contractors 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
11. As stated earlier, that government has implemented various intervention 
schemes as a bid to assist citizen contractor.  Do you think that the 
government should now treat citizen contractor development as a full fleshed 
development programme?  Explain 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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